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INTRODUCTION 
 
Current legal arrangements make homeowners high-stakes gamblers.1 
Homebuyers routinely take on crushing debt loads to put huge sums of 
money into risky, undiversified ventures that are utterly out of their 
personal control -- local housing markets.2  That these markets typically 
post positive returns over time is of little comfort to those caught on the 
downside of housing market volatility.  Moreover, because rights to these 
expected gains are priced into the home, many would-be buyers are priced 
out of the market. The shortcomings of the homeowner's investment 
package have not escaped notice, and for decades scholars and innovators 
have tried to devise better ways to manage the upside and downside risks of 
owning a home.3  Derivatives markets for such risk have recently begun to 
emerge, due in large part to the collaborative efforts of Karl Case, Robert 
Shiller, and Allan Weiss.4  
As the technical capacity to slice, dice, and trade homeownership risk 
advances, this paper steps back to examine how a reduced-risk version of 
homeownership fits together with property theory, human cognition, and the 
social dynamics of neighborhoods and metropolitan areas. To explore these 
                                                 
1 See Robert J. Shiller, American Casino, 295(2) ATLANTIC MONTHLY 33, 34 (March 2005) (discussing how 
consumers' exposure to market risk, including home price volatility, "threatens to transform the United States into 
a nation of gamblers").  
2 See, e.g., William A. Fischel , Why Are There NIMBYs?  77 LAND ECON 144, 146 (2001) (likening a home 
purchase to the use of nearly all one's assets to invest in "a single firm that produced one product in a single 
location"); Walter Updegrave, The Right Size House, CNN.money.com (July 16, 2004) (“[A] house is inherently 
an undiversified asset. You own a house in one city in one neighborhood on one block”).    
3 See, e.g., ANDREW CAPLIN ET AL., HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS: A NEW APPROACH TO A MARKET AT A 
CROSSROADS (1997); ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING 
SOCIETY'S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS (1993); Matityahu Marcus & Michael K. Taussig, A Proposal for 
Government Insurance of Home Values Against Locational Risks, 46 LAND ECON. 404 (1970); Part I.C., infra 
(surveying some of the past and proposed models for rearranging risk). Recent examples include Home Value 
Protection, http://www.syracusesni.org/equitysite/index.html (pilot program in Syracuse, New York offering 
home equity insurance); Rex & Co., www.rexagreement.com (U.S. investment firm that has recently begun 
offering funds in exchange for a share of home equity); Rick Jacobus & Jeffrey Lubell, Preservation of Affordable 
Homeownership:  A Continuum of Strategies, Center for Housing Policy, Policy Brief (April 2007) (surveying the 
range of home equity arrangements designed to deliver affordable homeownership); Ben Wilmot, Radical 
Thinking to Shake up the Mortgage Market, Australian Financial Review, Sept. 22, 2005, available at 
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/news/news.cfm?doc_id=4889 (describing venture that would offer reduced monthly 
payments to borrowers "in return for an interest in a home's capital appreciation"); Marjorie Ramseyeer Bardwell 
and James Geoffrey Durham, Transfer Fee Rights:  Is the Lure of Sharing in Future Appreciation a Flawed 
Concept? 21(3) Probate & Property 24, (May/June 2007) (discussing transfer fee rights that use covenants to 
retain some of the home's future appreciation); Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Why Not? Price-Protect Your Home, 
Forbes.com, August 29, 2002. 
4 In Spring 2006, futures and options based on housing indexes developed by Robert Shiller and Karl E. 
Case became tradable on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (now CME Group).  See infra Part I.C.4 (discussing 
these hedge instruments).  These housing market derivatives grew out of many years of work by Shiller, Case, and 
Weiss.  See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 3, at 78-87; ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER 118-20 
(2003); Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Home Equity Insurance, 19(1) J. REAL ESTATE FIN. AND ECON. 21 
(1999); Karl E. Case, Jr., Robert J. Shiller, & Allan N. Weiss, Index-Based Futures and Options in Real Estate, 
19(2) J. PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 83 (1993).    
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questions, I present a new tenure form -- Homeownership 2.0 or "H2.0" -- 
that seeks to optimally unbundle certain investment components from the 
core homeownership package. Central to my approach is a distinction 
between parcel-specific influences on home values, which the homeowner 
is in a good position to personally control or insure against ("onsite 
factors"), and influences on home values that emanate from beyond the four 
corners of the parcel, such as neighborhood changes and larger housing 
market trends ("offsite factors").  I argue that only those value changes 
relating to onsite factors are essential to the homeownership bundle as it 
exists today.  Historical inertia in property forms has kept offsite impacts in 
the homeowner's standard package, but requiring homeowners to invest in 
these factors as a matter of course is no more sensible than forcing them to 
invest in some other random, localized venture with variable returns.5 H2.0 
thus offers a reduced-risk alternative to traditional homeownership.6 
The basic idea behind H2.0 is simple.  At closing, a homebuyer is 
metaphorically presented with two dials that she may twist to adjust her 
ownership of upside and downside price volatility attributable to offsite 
factors.  Under traditional homeownership arrangements, all of the 
downside risk and upside potential is assigned to the homeowner; in other 
words, both dials are stuck at 100% and do not adjust.  Under H2.0, both 
dials are reset to 0% (or some other value) as a default matter with respect 
to offsite factors, and can be adjusted by the homebuyer as desired.7  In 
economic substance, the move from full risk-bearing to the H2.0 default 
position means that the homeowner compensates an investor to take on 
offsite downside risk, and an investor pays the homeowner for rights to 
offsite upside potential.8  Under the default arrangement, however, the 
homeowner would simply encounter an interface that repriced the home to 
take account of these changes.  She could then twist either or both dials to 
selectively add back in as much upside and downside risk relating to offsite 
factors as she wished to accept.   
The moving parts inside H2.0 -- market mechanisms for offloading 
homeownership risk -- are the ongoing work of others.9  My focus here is 
not on perfecting the technical elements of these underlying risk transfer 
                                                 
5 This is not to say that homeowners never have rational reasons for wanting to invest fully in their home's 
price trajectory.  For example, such investment might be undertaken as a hedge against rising prices in the same 
housing market if the household plans to "trade up" within the same community in the future.  See Lu Han, The 
Effects of Price Uncertainty on Home Purchase Decisions Over the Life Cycle (December 2005), available at 
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/lu.han/life_cycle.pdf.   
6 H2.0 would not require the creation of a new possessory estate, because the risk-shifting arrangements 
could all be handled through a standardized contractual package.  See infra Part II.D.   
7 The optimal default value is an open question, and one that interacts with other design choices, such as the 
treatment of inflation.  See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (discussing some of these issues).   
Assumptions about the likely future housing consumption plans of the household also bear on the default design.  
See infra Part V.A. 
8 For a simple example of how this might work, see text accompanying notes 88-91 infra.   
9 See notes 3-4, supra.   
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mechanisms, but rather on formulating a tenure package that is capable of 
delivering the benefits of these innovations to ordinary homeowners in a 
way that is compatible with property theory, human cognition, and the 
social goals of communities. Doing so, however, requires an understanding 
of how the underlying mechanisms would work and what their effects 
would be. Hence, H2.0 serves both as a prototype for how best to package 
homeownership risk transfers, and as a focal point for assessing the merits 
and demerits of the risk transfers themselves.   
The many advantages and concerns associated with the H2.0 approach 
will be spelled out below. For now, two basic points suffice.  First, allowing 
homebuyers to transfer offsite factor volatility to investors offers an 
untapped opportunity to produce Pareto improvements.10 For most U.S. 
households, non-labor wealth is dominated by a single, volatile asset -- the 
home.11  Placing so many of the household's eggs in one basket not only 
runs counter to basic principles of portfolio diversification, but also 
motivates potentially costly basket-guarding behaviors.12 Moreover, 
households that lack the financial wherewithal or risk tolerance to take on 
such a large investment simply cannot become homeowners.13  Facilitating  
transfers to investors, who can hold slices of housing risk within diversified 
portfolios, could produce substantial gains.   
Second, it is possible to package the means for accomplishing these 
transfers not as stand-alone products for chipping away at traditional 
                                                 
10 See CAPLIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 89 ("Simple portfolio theory argues that there is scope for a Pareto 
improvement if the owner-occupant sells a proportion of their home's asset value to a large, well-diversified 
financial institution.").   
11 See,  WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4 (2001); Brian K. Bucks, et al., Recent 
Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, Federal 
Reserve Bulletin A1, A22-23 (2006) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2004/bull0206.pdf  
(noting that "housing wealth is typically the largest component of families' fungible wealth"); see also note 42, 
infra (discussing  data from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances).  Human capital, which generated 78.7% of 
personal income in 2005, typically represents a larger share of household wealth than the home does.  See U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2007 Statistical Abstract, Personal Income and Its Disposition, Table 657, available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/income_expenditures_wealth/ (showing 2005 total personal income of 
$10,248.3 billion, with $7,125.3 billion in employee compensation and $938.7 billion in proprietor income); see 
also Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1353 (1993) (making the same point with 1989 
data).  Like home values, however, the market value of human capital is subject to significant volatility.  See e.g., 
SHILLER, supra note 4, at 107-10 (discussing the risk of pursuing particular livelihoods); JACOB S. HACKER, THE 
GREAT RISK SHIFT 60-85 (2006) (discussing job insecurity).  To the extent local housing prices are correlated 
with the performance of the local labor market, the exposure of working homeowners is amplified. See CAPLIN ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 73-75 & figs. 5.2 - 5.3 (discussing and illustrating correlation between changes in wages and 
those in house prices).    
12 See infra Part IV.A.  
13 The potentially suboptimal lumpiness of the home investment has been well noted.  See e.g., Stephen Day 
Cauley, et al., Homeownership as a Constraint on Asset Allocation, 34 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. AND ECON. 283, 309 
(2007) (describing the home purchase as a "lumpy investment that places a constraint on the owner's asset 
allocation decisions" and that can lead to suboptimally large investments in the home); CAPLIN ET AL.,  supra note 
3, at 85 (observing that there is a "major indivisibility" in the market for homes that "forces owners to tie their 
housing consumption decision to their asset accumulation and portfolio decisions").  To put it another way, 
homeowners must presently finance their homes only using debt financing, rather than a blend of debt and equity 
financing.  See Andrew Caplin et al., Shared Equity Mortgages, Housing Affordability, and Homeownership, 
Fannie Mae Foundation Report 1 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983100. 
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homeownership, but rather as a new and theoretically well-grounded 
alternative form of tenure. H2.0 represents a broad-spectrum response to a 
growing tension between the popular, boundary-oriented understanding of 
ownership and the reality of homeownership as it exists on the ground. As 
increasingly large percentages of home values are determined by conditions 
and events lying outside of the owned parcel, the idea that one can protect 
the value of one's property by fortifying and defending its boundaries has 
become absurd.  Homeowners have responded by trying to control as many 
offsite factors as possible through measures like exclusionary zoning and 
private covenants. Yet these efforts often entail heavy social costs and offer 
little or no protection against many sources of home price fluctuation.  H2.0 
offers an alternative way of restoring the balance between exposure and 
control.  Rather than expand control to align with investment exposure, 
homeowners can use H2.0 to scale down investment exposure to match 
their sphere of effective control.   
This is an ideal historical moment for such a proposal.  Home values, 
after a run of increases, have shown themselves to be vulnerable to 
significant downward movement.  At the same time, recent lending 
practices have injected price instability into the repayment schedules of 
millions of households.14 As these two factors converge to push significant 
numbers of U.S. homeowners into foreclosure,15 the wisdom of the national 
obsession with homeownership as an ideal is called into question.  We need 
not ditch homeownership, I argue; we can instead reconfigure it so that it is 
more capable of delivering what it promises. 
The paper proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I discuss the dual nature of 
homeownership as a source of consumption value and as an investment 
vehicle,16 and discuss past and ongoing attempts to remove some of the 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA'S LATEST BOOM AND BUST 17-18 
(2007) (explaining that subprime mortgages are typically adjustable rate mortgages that feature an initially low 
interest rate that is fixed for only two or three years; the mortgage then becomes adjustable and can reset to much 
higher interest rates); James R. Hagerty and Ken Gepfert, Home Security: One Family's Journey Into a Subprime 
Trap, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2007, at A1 (discussing and depicting the "projected value of home mortgages due to 
'reset' to higher interest rates" over the next few years).  In recent years, subprime lending has expanded 
dramatically.  See GRAMLICH, supra, at 6 (observing that subprime mortgage originations grew from $35 million 
in 1994 to $625 billion in 2005, representing a shift from less than five percent of all mortgage originations to 
twenty percent of all mortgage originations); Hagerty & Gepfert, supra (reporting that 20% of mortgages in 2006 
were subprime loans).   
15 See Hagerty & Gepfert, supra note 14 (reporting projections that foreclosures in 2007 and 2008 will total 
760,000 and 935,000, respectively, compared with an average of 440,000 foreclosures per year from 2000 through 
2006).   
16 See, e.g., Jan K. Brueckner, Consumption and Investment Motives and the Portfolio Choices of 
Homeowners, 15 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. AND ECON. 159 (1997); Satyajit Chatterjee, Taxes, Homeownership, and 
the Allocation of Residential Real Estate, Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Sept/Oct 
1996) at http://www.phil.frb.org/files/br/sobr96sc.html, at 3 ("a home purchase really involves two distinct 
transactions bundled into one: the purchase of a house and the purchase of service benefits (comfort and shelter) 
that flow from the house"); J.V. Henderson & Y.M. Ioannides, A Model of Housing Tenure Choice, 73 AM. ECON. 
REV. 98, 102 (1983) ("Durables such as housing may serve dual purposes for many consumers -- as a 
consumption good and as an investment in a portfolio").     
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upside or downside investment volatility from the homeownership bundle.  
Part II explains how the new H2.0 package would unbundle the elements 
essential to homeownership from offsite investment risk factors, and 
outlines its key advantages.  Part III explores the cognitive barriers to the 
acceptance of H2.0, as well as concerns that cognitive biases might lead 
consumers to misuse it.  Part IV considers broader societal implications of a 
change in the content and meaning of homeownership, including impacts at 
the neighborhood, local government, and metropolitan scales.  Part V 
suggests some directions for further research.    
  
I.  THE ELEMENTS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP  
 
If we believed that homeowners were affirmatively choosing to bet a 
hefty chunk of their household wealth on the fortunes of their local housing 
markets, then homeownership's current configuration would be fully 
satisfactory.  For some, such as those who plan to make future home 
purchases within the same housing market, such an investment may indeed 
be quite deliberate.  In such instances, the household's current investment in 
the local housing market can serve as a hedge against future price increases 
in that same market; the original home's appreciation can help to fund the 
consumption of other housing that experiences closely correlated price 
changes.17  Other homeowners may purposefully invest as part of a 
diversified portfolio or simply because of their personal investing 
preferences.  But it seems likely that many homeowners gamble on the 
future of their local housing markets only by accident, because existing 
institutional arrangements offer them no alternative.  
Households desire homeownership for many reasons:  it delivers a 
stable stream of housing consumption, a large degree of personal control 
over the residence, access to superior housing stock and public services, 
important tax advantages, and unparalleled social and status benefits.18 
While the volatility of the home's value may be part of the appeal for some 
homeowners, for others it simply comes with the territory. As Andrew 
Caplin and his coauthors put it, “the current market does not allow a 
                                                 
17 See Han, supra note 5; see also James Banks et al., House Price Volatility and Housing Ownership Over 
the Life Cycle at 10, University College London Discussion Papers in Economics No. 04-09 (December 2004), 
available at http://www.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/working_paper_series/0409.pdf (discussing the "insurance" 
function of owner occupancy).  I thank Michael Abramowicz for comments on this point.  The statement in the 
text assumes that price movements are closely correlated within a given local housing market.  See id.  This might 
not be the case if there is significant heterogeneity within that market as to the ratio between the value of the land 
and the value of the improvements, given the potential for those two components to appreciate at different rates. 
See Raphael W. Bostic et al., Land Leverage: Decomposing Home Price Dynamics, 35 REAL ESTATE ECON. 183, 
187 (2007) (positing that varying ratios of land value to total home value can produce "asymmetric appreciation" 
within a given local housing market as a result of "asymmetric exposure to common shocks to land values").    
18 See, e.g., CAPLIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 24-28 (discussing many advantages of homeownership, 
including tax benefits, greater control over terms of tenure, better-maintained housing stock, and access to 
communities offering desirable amenities and public services);  Part I.A., infra.    
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household to separate its housing investment decision from its housing 
consumption decision.”19   In subparts A and B, I examine homeownership's 
consumption and investment components, respectively.  In subpart C, I 
briefly survey some past and ongoing programs designed to decouple these 
elements in various ways. This discussion will set the stage for the 
introduction in Part II of H2.0's version of homeownership. 
 
A.  Homeownership as Consumption 
 
Households need not buy a home in order to consume housing; they can 
rent instead.  The leasehold neatly separates consumption of housing from 
investment in housing -- the landlord invests, while her tenants consume. 
We might think, then, that homeowners must be willing investors, or they 
would not enter into homeownership at all. This logic breaks down, 
however, if we think that the consumption streams available to tenants tend 
to be systematically inferior to those available to homeowners.20 It is 
therefore worth examining how the homeownership brand of housing 
consumption differs from the leasehold variety. 
A much-cited advantage of owing a home is the element of price 
protection it provides.  In housing markets without rent control, tenants face 
significant uncertainty about how much their current housing will cost in 
future periods.21 The rental amount is guaranteed to remain fixed only for 
the lease term, often a year or less, and may rise thereafter without warning.  
As advocates of rent control have noted, this uncertainty poses a threat to 
the plans of residents who wish to put down roots in a given area with an 
expectation of building an ongoing life there.22  In contrast, the price paid 
for a home is fixed at the time of purchase, and will not rise thereafter.23   
On closer examination, however, the homeowner's price protection 
advantage looks less impressive. The vast majority of homebuyers finance 
their purchases, and credit arrangements can introduce price instability.  
Homeowners' insurance, required by lenders, can spike upward in cost.24  
                                                 
19 CAPLIN ET AL.,  supra note 3, at 80. 
20 In addition, as explored in Part I.B., infra, the fact that a homeowner desires to invest at some level in the 
housing that she consumes does not establish that she wishes to take on the full quantum of investment associated 
with both onsite and offsite risks.   
21 See Todd Sinai & Nicholas S. Souleles, Owner-Occupied Housing as a Hedge Against Rent Risk 
University of Pennsylvania, Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 01-03, FRB 
Philadelphia Working Paper 05-10 (January 8, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=389404. 
22 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 359-62, 368-70 
(1986) (discussing the significance of continued residence from personhood and community perspectives); Greg 
Smithsimon, Rent Regulation: The Right Tool for the Right Job, Planetizen, May 14, 2007, available at 
http://planetizen.com/node/24451 (suggesting rent regulation's purpose is to provide housing stability).   
23 See, e.g., Sinai & Souleles, supra note 21, at 1 (discussing the home purchase as including "a hedge 
against rent fluctuations").   
24 See, e.g., Jim Yardley, Texas Home Insurance Crisis Roils Residents and Top Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
2002 (discussing rising premiums and termination of homeowners' insurance coverage in Texas, in part due to the 
cost of mold-related claims); Joseph B. Treastor, Home Insurers Embrace the Heartland, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 
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Property taxes can rise rapidly and unexpectedly.25 Maintenance and repair 
costs can be large and unpredictable.26  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the homeowner may want or need to move. When she does, her 
ability to obtain housing elsewhere depends on the sales price of her current 
home, a value that is subject to great investment risk.27   
Nonetheless, tenants face additional uncertainty that is different in kind. 
At least in the absence of limitations imposed by law, a landlord can sell the 
property, convert the property to some other use, or decide to occupy it 
herself as a residence -- all events that would physically dispossess the 
tenant.28  In contrast, all homeowners possess something very valuable -- 
the option to remain in their current house for as long as they wish, 
provided they make the necessary mortgage and tax payments.29  This 
option is not absolute -- it can be overridden by the government through 
eminent domain or nullified by other factors that make continued habitation 
impossible, such as natural disasters -- but it is very robust.  Indeed, the 
reaction to Kelo v. City of New London30 can be understood as affirming the 
degree to which ordinary people value the option to stay put, and how 
strongly the notion of homeownership is associated with that option.   
In addition, renters often face rather severe constraints on their 
autonomy with regard to matters such as pet keeping, decorating, and 
landscaping.  They often face restrictions on adding occupants to the 
household or subleasing the property.31  While the autonomy of 
homeowners with respect to such matters has also become increasingly 
                                                                                                                            
2006 (reporting on premium increases and coverage refusals in coastal areas).   
25 Often, this is a function of changes in the property's underlying value that could, in theory, be tapped to 
meet the larger tax bill.  However, accessing the equity to meet rising tax bills can be cumbersome and distasteful 
for homeowners. 
26 While long-term maintenance contracts can shift some of these risks, the residual risk remains on the 
homeowner.  A landlord's tenants may also ultimately bear the costs of repairs and maintenance, but they are 
likely to do so as a group, so that the risk of particularly expensive repairs are pooled.    
27 If housing prices move in tandem in both the housing market from which a homeowner is departing and 
the one that she is entering, fluctuations pose a much smaller risk to the stream of housing consumption.   But if 
the two housing markets experience different changes in housing prices, dips in the value of one's present home 
will prove more threatening.  See Part V.A, infra.   
28 See, e.g., Cara Solomon, Seniors Shoved Aside by Condo Conversions, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 13, 2007 
(discussing the hardships for displaced tenants of landlords' decisions to convert properties to condominiums).   
29 The fact that homeowners have this option does not mean that they always use it.  However, moving rates 
are much lower among homeowners than among renters.  Census data show that one-third of renter households 
changed residences between 2002 and 2003, compared with one in fourteen households living in owner-occupied 
housing at the time of the survey.  Jason P. Schacter, Geographic Mobility:  2002 to 2003, U.S. Census Bureau, 
Current Population Reports 5 (March 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-549.pdf.  
Data for 2004 to 2005 reflect moves by 29% of renter households and 6.34% owner-occupant households.  See 
U.S. Census Bureau, Geographic Mobility:  2004 to 2005, Detailed Tables, Table 17, General Mobility of 
Householders, by Tenure, Age, and Household Income in 2004:  2004 to 2005, available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/cps2005/tab17-2.xls; 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/cps2005/tab17-3.xls. 
30 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
31 Law places some limits on these restrictions.  For example, the federal Fair Housing Act protects families 
with children against discrimination, and thus would typically protect the right of parents to add their own 
children, or children who have been placed in their custody, to the household. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 802(k); 804. 
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limited as common interest communities featuring tight restrictions have 
gained market share,32  owners still generally enjoy greater latitude than 
renters in choosing how to use and modify the property.  Perhaps more 
importantly, tenant households typically confront a constrained housing 
choice set relative to homebuyers.  Most of the single-family housing stock 
in the country is owner occupied, and owners tend to sell their homes when 
they move rather than offer them for rent.  Moreover, rental houses are 
likely to receive less care and attention, on average, from their owners and 
occupants, making it less likely that pristine homes will appear on the rental 
market.33   
At least in theory, many of the disadvantages of renting could be 
resolved contractually through different lease provisions.  Residential leases 
could be extended to terms lasting several decades, for example, and could  
delegate to the tenant free choice on a wide array of matters that 
customarily have been left to the discretion of homeowners. While 
contractual provisions alone would not expand the spectrum of available 
rental housing, if leaseholds became increasingly attractive along the 
dimensions just suggested, tenants would be expected to bid up rents and 
eventually trigger an expansion in the supply of housing stock available for 
rent. But important moral hazard problems remain.34 In addition, there are 
two important advantages to owning that improved leasehold terms cannot 
address.   
First, homeowners enjoy significant federal income tax benefits that 
tenants do not receive.  Homeowners pay no tax on imputed rent, yet can 
deduct their major expenses (mortgage interest and property taxes) if they 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the 
Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 555-56 (2002) (giving examples of restrictions placed on property 
owners in common interest communities governing matters such as landscaping, exterior aesthetic choices, and 
even some aspects of dress and conduct); Zach Rawling, Reevaluating Leasing Restrictions in Common Interest 
Developments: Rejecting Reasonableness in Favor of Consent (2007), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/zach_rawling/3 (discussing restrictions on  leasing properties in common interest 
communities to tenants). 
33 The tenant might be expected to neglect the owner's long-term interests in the property, while the owner 
might be expected to neglect aspects of the tenant's consumption stream that do not affect the property's value 
over the long run.  The result is a "double moral hazard problem" in which both parties exert less effort than 
optimal on the property.  See Derek K.Y. Chau et al., Leases with Purchase Options and Double Moral Hazard, 
33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1390, 1391 (2006) (describing the "double moral hazard problem inherent in leases" and 
suggesting the ability of a purchase option to resolve it); see also Henderson and Ioannides, supra note 16 
(describing and modeling the "rental externality").  A "lemons" dynamic may amplify this phenomenon.  See 
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 
488, 489 (1970).  Tenants who cannot tell ex ante whether a given rental is high-quality or low-quality will only 
be willing to pay for an average-quality rental.  Because tenant price resistance makes it unprofitable for landlords 
to offer high-quality rentals, the average quality of rentals will drop.  Likewise, if tenants have unobservable 
characteristics that determine how much care they will take of the home, landlords will gravitate toward price-
amenity combinations that will be profitable when average-care tenants move in.  Because these price-amenity 
combinations are not as attractive to high-care tenants, high-care tenants will have an incentive to become 
homeowners. See Robert D. Dietz & Donald R. Haurin, The Social and Micro-Level Consequences of 
Homeownership, 54 J. URB. ECON. 401, 422 (2003) (citing Henderson and Ioannides, supra note 16). 
34 See supra note 33. 
11-Oct-07] HOMEOWNERSHIP 2.0 11 
itemize.35 In addition, homeowners can receive up to $250,000 in tax-free 
gains on the sale of their home ($500,000 for a married couple).36 Their 
renting counterparts, in contrast, must pay rent with after-tax dollars to 
landlords who receive no analogous tax benefits.   
It might seem at first that the tax implications of homeownership should 
play no role in thinking about whether to introduce a new tenure form, since  
tax policy can always be manipulated directly if doing so is deemed socially 
desirable. For example, eliminating the tax advantages of homeownership 
altogether might spur the development of the types of enhanced leasehold 
alternatives discussed above, closing the consumption gap between owning 
and leasing.37 But the complete elimination of homeownership tax 
advantages probably lies outside the realm of current political possibility.38 
Absent such a sweeping reform, leaseholds are less likely to evolve in ways 
that will fill the consumption gap.  Moreover, the introduction of a new 
tenure form -- a new category into which households could self-select -- 
could be essential in facilitating the more limited reform of extending tax 
advantages to a broader spectrum of the population.    
Perhaps even more important to the dominance of homeownership is its  
tremendous psychological and cultural importance.  At least outside of 
metropolitan areas like New York where renting is common among all 
social strata, ownership is the ideal to which most households in the U.S. 
aspire.  Renting, in contrast, is widely viewed as a transitional state that is 
not consonant with long-run stability.39  Here, too, we must ask what 
                                                 
35 Chatterjee, supra note 16 (discussing the significance of the nontaxation of imputed rent); 26 U.S.C. §§ 
163(h); 164 (deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes).  The fact that only those taxpayers who 
itemize can receive these deductions makes them quite regressive in their operation, and also calls into question 
their presumed positive effect on increasing the rate of homeownership.  For a recent discussion, see William G. 
Gale et al., Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX NOTES 1171 (June 18, 2007).    
36 26 U.S.C. §121. This tax advantage can only be claimed once very two years, and certain conditions must 
be met regarding the ownership and use of the home.  See id.  Losses on the primary residence are not deductible.   
37 See Chatterjee, supra note 16, at 3 (suggesting that, "[i]n the absence of a tax advantage to owner-
occupants, the market would tend to 'unbundle' these distinct transactions," so that "[t]he household that most 
values the services of a house will rent it from those best able to bear the financial risks of homeownership").     
38 More limited reforms may well be imaginable, however.  See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 35.  Eliminating 
the mortgage interest deduction, a common policy target, might not produce all of the desired effects on its own, 
given the ability of some households (especially those with high incomes), to finance their home purchases 
through other means (say, by paying cash) while still enjoying the core tax advantage -- nontaxation of imputed 
rent.  See James R. Follain & Lisa Sturman Melamed, The False Messiah of Tax Policy: What Elimination of the 
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Promises and a Careful Look at What it Delivers, 9 J. HOUS. RES. 179 (1998).  
An example presented by Chatterjee makes the point clearly.  Imagine a household has $100,000 cash on hand 
that it can either use to buy a house or to buy stocks (the dividends from which will be used to pay rent).  If the 
household buys the stocks, it will have to pay tax on the dividends the investment generates before those 
dividends can be converted into housing consumption through the payment of rent.  If the household buys the 
house, however, it will not have to pay tax on the "dividends" produced by the asset (imputed rent), but can 
instead simply enjoy an untaxed housing consumption stream. See Chatterjee, supra note 16, at 2. The mortgage 
interest deduction puts the homebuyer who finances the purchase in the same position as the cash buyer by 
allowing her to service her housing debt with pre-tax dollars so that she too can enjoy an untaxed housing stream 
from the purchased asset.  See id at 2-3.  As Chatterjee notes, the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction 
could be coupled with the nontaxation of income from capital to remove the distortion to tenure choice.  See id. at 
5. 
39 See, e.g., CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN AMERICA 53 
12 Fennell [11-Oct-07 
underlies the impulse toward ownership.  The desire for a stable option -- a 
place that is one's home for as long as one chooses to stay there – is 
certainly part of the story.  The other advantages noted above also likely 
play a role.  But there seems to be something essential about claiming a 
place as one's own that cannot be reduced to these practical benefits.  That 
essential element of ownership, I will argue, is bound up with the onsite 
investment facet of homeownership.40   
If a sense of ownership requires some level of investment, no leasehold 
can fully replicate the consumption experience of homeownership.  Whether 
or not we ought to encourage people to develop and sustain a taste for 
ownership is, of course, a separate question.  Longer and better leaseholds 
and reform of homeownership's tax advantages are worthy goals, and ones 
that might in the long run help to produce a society that is less enamored of 
ownership.  But taking the world as we find it, with strong social and 
governmental pressures pushing households toward ownership, there is a 
large gap on the tenure spectrum that the leasehold cannot answer.    
 
B.  Homeownership as an Investment 
 
Homebuyers do not just purchase a consumption stream, they also make 
an investment.41 This investment is typically the single largest in the 
household’s portfolio,42 and it is often heavily leveraged.43  Do homeowners 
seek out this level of investment exposure, or do they merely tolerate it?  
Because households cannot presently offload unwanted home price 
volatility, it is difficult to determine the relative proportions of eager and 
reluctant gamblers among American homeowners.  However, economic 
analysis suggests that  the linkage of housing consumption and housing 
investment produces a binding constraint on portfolio choice that yields 
                                                                                                                            
(1977) (describing renters as occupying a category that is "by definition one of transition in American axioms 
about the sequence of life."); Sheila Klebanow, How Much is Enough?  A Psychological Overview of Money and 
the Middle Class, in MONEY AND MIND 3, 6-7 (Sheila Klebanow & Eugene L. Lowenkopf, eds., 1991) ("For 
many, homeownership connotes solidity, stability, self-esteem, putting down roots, and making a commitment to 
oneself, or to marriage and family.").  
40 See infra Part I.B.   
41 See supra note 16. 
42 See supra note 11. According to the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, the median net worth of a 
homeowning family in the U.S. was $184,400, which only narrowly exceeded the value of the median primary 
residence, $160,000.  See Bucks et al., supra note 11, at A.23, tbl. 8B.  The median amount of home equity for a 
homeowning family was $86,000 in 2004, see id. at A28, n.36, making the ratio between median home equity and 
the median net worth of a homeowning family .467.   
43 For homeowning families with mortgages, the median amount of debt secured by the primary residence 
was $95,000 in 2004.  That same year, roughly 70% of the debt of all families was for purposes of purchasing a 
primary residence.  See id. at A32, tbl. 12.  This somewhat understates the significance of the home debt burden 
for homeowning families, because that figure includes families that do not own a home at all.  On the other hand, 
the attribution of all of this debt to the "purpose" of buying a home does not account for the fact that many 
families use debt financing of the home to free up money elsewhere, and hence avoid other forms of debt.  See id. 
at A31-32.  
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inefficient results.44  In other words, homeowners would invest differently -
- and more efficiently -- if they had full freedom to allocate their investment 
dollars between housing and non-housing investments. 
At the same time, the homeownership consumption stream is, by 
definition, one that allows the owner to view herself as an owner.  I have 
suggested that some level of investment is necessary to enjoy in an 
authentic manner the consumption good of homeownership. But how 
much?  Clearly, the personal shouldering of all risks cannot be a 
prerequisite to our understanding of ownership.  Homeowners typically 
carry insurance against casualty losses that offload risks that they cannot 
efficiently bear, yet no one would suggest that an insured home is any less 
fully “owned.”  Similarly, most homeowners have a mortgage on the 
property that places some investment risk on the lender,45 yet the title of 
“homeowner” is not called into question.    
A better way of understanding the homeowner's relationship to risk is 
found in Yoram Barzel's notion of the property holder as the “residual 
claimant” -- a party who bears any property-related risks that have not been 
contractually (or legally) placed on others.46  That formulation, however, 
does not tell anything about the kinds of risk (if any) to which a homeowner 
must remain exposed in order to be regarded as, and to view herself as, the 
property's owner. The problem can be approached from a different angle by 
considering Henry Smith's explanation of why owners are residual 
claimants in the first place.47 Smith observes that a residual claim captures 
difficult-to-measure contributions.48  Thus, the party whose inputs are 
"hardest to measure" will be treated as the residual claimant or owner -- the 
one who gets whatever outcomes remain after all the other, easier-to-
measure claims have been sorted out.49   
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Cauley et al., supra note 13, at 309 (finding that, under reasonable assumptions, "homeowners 
would require a 6% increase in total net worth to achieve the same utility level as an individual not facing the 
asset allocation constraint," and suggesting that the figure could rise as high as 25% in some regions);  Brueckner, 
supra note 16 (modeling the constraint of homeownership on the investment choices of homeowners and 
concluding that "when the constraint is binding, the optimal portfolio of the homeowner is inefficient in a mean-
variance sense, reflecting overinvestment in housing"); Henderson & Ioannides, supra note 16, at 111 (examining 
the significance of the "dual role of housing as a consumption and investment good" in determining tenure choice, 
and the possibility that households will "'distort' their investment and consumption choices and owner-occupy 
rather than rent"). 
45 In the event of default, lenders may not be able to sell the home for enough money to cover the 
outstanding mortgage debt, especially in a falling market.  See, e.g., James R. Hagerty, Mortgage Woes Force 
Banks to Take Hits to Sell Homes, WALL ST. J. (online), May 14, 2007, page A2.  While the lender can attempt to 
recover any shortfall from the homeowner (unless the loan is non-recourse), homeowners in such a position may 
declare bankruptcy.  See Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Moral Hazard in Home Equity Conversion, 28 REAL 
ESTATE ECON. 1, 13-14 (2000). 
46 YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 78-79 (2d ed. 1997); see also Henry E. 
Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1795-96 (2004) (applying and explaining the idea of 
a property owner as "the holder of the residual claim"). 
47 See Smith, supra note 46, at 1795-97. 
48 Id. at 1796. 
49 See id. at 1796-97. 
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To translate these ideas to the homeownership context, it is helpful to 
distinguish between sources of  property value movement that are within the 
household's control and sources of property value volatility that are out of 
the household's control.50  The former relate to the household's own day-to-
day inputs, which will typically be difficult for others to accurately 
measure.  Indeed, this very difficulty in measurement would present moral 
hazard problems if responsibility for outcomes under the household's 
control were to be shifted to third parties.51 The idea that factors under the 
household's control produce the residual for which it bears responsibility 
fits well with the intuition that investment in the gains and losses that 
accompany the household's own choices lie at the core of homeownership.52   
In contrast, it seems evident that homeowners need not speculate on 
local, regional, or national movements in housing prices to enjoy a genuine 
sense of ownership, just as they need not gamble on fires or natural 
disasters in order to be true owners.  If there were no cost-effective way to 
disaggregate the impacts of these factors from homeowner's own difficult-
to-measure inputs, we might nonetheless be required to make these risks 
part of the owner's residual package.  If local housing indexes and other 
mechanisms can accomplish disaggregation at reasonable cost, however, the 
offloading of those risks that lie out of the household's control would not 
seem to present any intrinsic threat to the notion of ownership.53  To be 
sure, some homeowners will wish to take on the risk associated with home 
price movements outside their control, just as they might wish to engage in 
any other outside investment opportunity. But a household should not be 
required to purchase what amounts to a specific number of shares in a 
localized and undiversified index fund -- the local housing market -- simply 
because it desires a particular level of housing consumption. 
Indeed, it would be mere happenstance if a household's optimal 
investment in local home price movements turned out to precisely 
correspond to the purchase price of the home that the household presently 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., John Emmeus Davis, Shared Equity Homeownership: The Changing Landscape of Resale-
Restricted, Owner-Occupied Housing  65 (2006) available at http://www.nhi.org/policy/SharedEquity.html 
(observing that "the bulk" of home appreciation "is usually caused by societal factors outside of the homeowner's 
control, including public investment in the city as a whole, private investment in the surrounding neighborhood, 
changes in the regional economy, and changes in the way that residential real estate is regulated, financed, and 
taxed").    
51 See Shiller & Weiss, supra note 45, at 5-11 (discussing moral hazard with respect to multiple decisions 
about the home, including maintenance, improvement, and marketing and sale of the home);  infra Part II.B.   
52 Of course, homeowners can and do enter into contracts with maintenance companies, landscapers, interior 
designers, and the like with respect to onsite factors, and these contracts may shift enumerated risks in various 
ways (say, through warranties). See, e.g., BARZEL, supra note 46, at 115-17 (discussing the example of a 
refrigerator warranty).  But the owner is responsible for orchestrating these arrangements (or delegating their 
orchestration) and bears the outcomes that remain after the contractual dust settles.    
53 Whether disaggregation can be made sufficiently accurate and cheap to be worthwhile is a separate 
question.  Although the development of local indexes has made such disaggregation more feasible, difficulties 
remain.  See infra Part II.B.  The point of the textual statement is simply that homeownership itself would not 
require acceptance of these offsite risks  if mechanisms existed to parcel them out to investors.   
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wishes to consume.  That observation has implications that run in two 
directions.  The analysis thus far has primarily emphasized that some 
households may wish to accept less risk associated with offsite factors than 
is required by the traditional homeownership package.  But other 
households (including some who do not own their own homes) might wish 
to invest at a greater level in a given local housing market than would be 
feasible through the traditional homeownership model.  Consider the 
possibility raised earlier that a home purchase within a given housing 
market might serve as a hedge against price increases within that same 
market.  In a period of rapidly rising home prices, a household  might feel 
pressured to buy earlier than they otherwise would and obtain a more 
expensive house than they otherwise would in order to "lock-in" their 
purchasing power.54  Decoupling consumption and investment would 
relieve such pressures by permitting people to purchase housing market 
futures and options independent of the purchase of housing.   
 More generally, markets in housing market volatility would enable 
investors to invest in more owner-occupied housing than they wish to 
presently consume.  Investors can already invest in more housing than they 
wish to consume, of course, but only by entering into a landlord-tenant 
relationship, with its attendant moral hazards.55 Investment in owner-
occupied housing, which presumes the presence of an owner-occupant who 
can be trusted to keep up the house to the investor's standards, can presently 
only be achieved if the investor occupies the property herself.  Thus, just as 
current arrangements require homeowners to invest fully if they want to 
consume owner-occupied housing, investors must consume housing 
themselves if they want to invest in owner-occupied housing.  A market that 
enables some homeowners to consume beyond their investments would also 
allow other homeowners (or non-homeowners) to invest in more owner-
occupied housing than they wish to personally consume. The fact that our 
current system of homeownership tethers together consumption of housing 
with full investment in housing creates not one but two sources of potential 
suboptimality in homeownership.56     
 
C.  Decoupling Initiatives, Past and Present 
 
If decoupling some portion of investment risk from homeownership is 
such a good idea, one may well ask, why don't mechanisms already exist for 
                                                 
54 See Banks et al., supra note 17, at 9-11. 
55 See, e.g., Chau et al., supra note 33, at 1391.   
56 Past treatments have suggested that the linkage of investment and consumption in housing produces an 
inefficiency only when consumption demand exceeds investment demand, and not in the opposite case.  See, e.g., 
Henderson & Ioannides, supra note 16, at 104 & n.3 (describing the problem as the amounting to a "one-
directional indivisibility").  
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accomplishing it?57 There are two answers.  First, quite a few such 
mechanisms do exist, albeit in limited form, and this section will survey 
some of them.  Second, to the extent these mechanisms have failed (so far) 
to attract widespread adoption by homeowners and institutions, there are 
plausible explanations.  For one thing, the profusion of varying designs and 
an accompanying fragmentation of analysis has kept these programs from 
finding a firm theoretical footing.  In addition, the challenges that face 
attempts to alter homeownership are not insubstantial and are likely to 
require significant investments in design, development and experimentation 
-- all of which takes time and money.  As Robert Shiller has observed, such 
financial innovations may represent public goods that the private market 
would be expected to undersupply.58  
Below, I briefly discuss four models for explicitly altering the 
investment component of homeownership -- a far from exhaustive survey, 
but one that is sufficient to offer a sense of the range of approaches.59    All 
of these models modify the way in which changes in a home's market value 
translate into changes in homeowner payoffs.  Under traditional 
homeownership, there is a one-to-one relationship between market value 
changes and changes in homeowner payoffs (setting aside bankruptcy 
protection, nonrecourse loans, and the like).60  For each dollar that the home 
changes in value, the homeowner's payoff changes in the same direction by 
exactly one dollar.61 The devices discussed below reduce (sometimes to 
zero) the positive or negative impact of changes in market value on the 
homeowner's payoff, either across all possible values or within some 
range.62    
 
1. Equity Insurance Programs 
 
In 1978, the Village of Oak Park, Illinois pioneered an "equity assurance 
program" in an effort to forestall "panic selling" in response to anticipated 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., CAPLIN ET AL., supra note 3, at xiii ("If this is such a good idea, why has nobody done it 
already?"); William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects, 41 
URBAN STUDIES 317, 335 (2004) ("if home equity insurance is the answer, why have the creative people who do 
real estate development and finance not come up with it on their own?"). 
58 See SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS, supra note 3, at 207-08.    
59 Some additional arrangements implicitly accomplish a degree of decoupling.  For example, rent control 
and other tenant protections can be viewed as attempts to provide a consumption experience that is closer to that 
of a homeowner without the accompanying investment.  In addition, a small amount of downside investment risk 
is effectively decoupled from homeownership through the existence of bankruptcy protection and other devices or 
practices (such as non-recourse loans or loan balance forgiveness upon foreclosure) that keep homeowners from 
bearing the full brunt of home value losses.   See Shiller & Weiss, supra note 45, at 3.   Reverse mortgages are 
typically non-recourse loans, and hence build in downside protection.  Id. 
60 See id. at 13-14 
61 The relationship between home value and the owner's equity in the home can therefore be depicted as a 
straight line with a slope of one.  See id. at 12-13 & fig. 1. 
62 These changes can be graphically depicted as changes in the slope of the line that represents traditional 
homeownership.  See supra note 61; Shiller & Weiss, supra note 45, at 13-15 & figs. 2-4. 
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racial changes in the neighborhood. The program promised to cover 
property value losses under specified circumstances.63  The principle was 
identical to that behind FDIC insurance:  by reassuring people that their 
investment is safe where it stands, cascades of fear-driven dislocations are 
precluded.64  A Chicago voter referendum in 1987 introduced a similar 
program that communities could opt into, and a number of other cities have 
begun to explore this approach.65   
In recent years, William Fischel has advocated home equity insurance to 
reduce provincial homeowner behavior, again focusing on the potential 
impacts of highly localized factors on home values.66 Robert Shiller and 
others have sought to extend the home equity insurance concept to cover a 
much broader spectrum of risks, including exposure to nationwide, regional, 
and metropolitan housing market fluctuations.67 A pilot program in 
Syracuse, New York has sought to deliver such broad-spectrum protection 
to residents.68  
Shiller and Case have taken an important step toward making broader 
home equity insurance programs feasible by introducing local housing 
market indexes that could be used to settle insurance claims.69  The 
Syracuse pilot program, for example, makes use of a zip-code based 
housing price index to determine payouts.70  These indexes respond to 
moral hazard concerns that arise from insuring home values -- the worry 
that insured homeowners will be less concerned with taking care of their 
homes and less willing to expend effort to obtain a good resale price.71  
While no real-world index can perfectly pick up all home price fluctuations 
that are not unique to the individual residence, an indexing system makes 
                                                 
63 The Oak Park program would pay homeowners for 80% of any loss on resale after five years of 
enrollment in the plan, if the house sold below its appraised value and the drop in value was not attributable to 
metropolitan-area value changes, or to damage or loss to the individual property.  See Maureen A. McNamara, 
The Legacy and Efficacy of Homeowner's Equity Assurance: A Study of Oak Park, Illinois, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 
1463, 1468-69; Shiller & Weiss, supra note 4, at 32-33.  Oak Park has not experienced a significant home price 
decline since the program was implemented, and no claim has been made under the program. See Shiller & Weiss, 
supra note 4, at 33.  It is impossible to know what role, if any, the equity assurance program played in Oak Park's 
home price patterns, especially given that the equity assurance program was only one part of a multi-prong effort 
to preserve stability in Oak Park.  See McNamara, supra, at 1481. 
64 See Marcus & Taussig, supra note 3, at 407 (observing that "the desired effect [of home equity insurance] 
is analogous to the success of FDIC in ending recurrent banking panics").   
65 See Shiller & Weiss, supra note 4, at 32-33. 
66 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 57, at 318, 335-36 (citing Albert Breton, Neighborhood Selection and Zoning 
in ISSUES IN URBAN PUBLIC ECONOMICS 241 (H. Hochman, ed. 1973).    
67 See infra Part I.C.4. 
68 For details on the program, see http://www.syracusesni.org/equitysite/index.html; see also Andrew Caplin, 
et al., Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project, Yale International Center for Finance, Working Paper No. 03-12 
(May 3, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=41014.  Early reports indicated that program had attracted 
few participants. See Sarah Max, Selling L.A., Buying Chicago, CNNMoney.com, Aug. 9, 2004 (reporting that 
"since the [Syracuse] program was launched in August 2002 ... only 76 homeowners have signed up, according to 
its director Virginia Smith").   
69 See infra Part I.C.4.      
70 See http://www.syracusesni.org/equitysite/faqs/faqs.html (discussing how payments are tied to the zip-
code index and explaining the incentive structure this provides).   
71 See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 3, at 82. 
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possible at least a rough decoupling of investment risk attributable to offsite 
factors.72   
 
2. Collectivized Equity  
 
Efforts to provide affordable homeownership have spawned a variety of 
arrangements known by names such as “limited equity coops” and "resale-
restricted housing."73 While the details of these arrangements vary, all of 
them reconfigure the right to the home's upside potential to achieve social 
objectives. The basic idea is to provide a low-income household with a 
home at a below-market price and then place limits on that household's 
ability to “cash out” the home at its full market value through subsequent 
sales or leases.74 The equity in the home does not fully belong to the 
household, at least at the outset, but rather is shared (in various ways) with 
some collective body, whether public or private.75  When the home is sold, 
some part of the proceeds go to someone other than the household 
designated as its owner.   
 
3. Shared Appreciation and Shared Equity Models 
 
Commercial lenders and investment companies have experimented with 
shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs) and shared equity mortgages 
(SEMs).  Notwithstanding some failed attempts in the U.S. during the late 
1970s,76 there has been a recent resurgence of interest in these possibilities.  
The Bank of Scotland offered shared appreciation mortgages in the U.K. 
during the mid-1990s,77 an Australian venture began seeking investment 
funds for a form of "equity finance mortgages" in 2005.78 and an American 
company has recently launched a similar program under the name of Rex 
Agreement.79  Under these models, the lender compensates the homeowner 
                                                 
72 See infra Part II.B. 
73 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 50, at 2- 3; J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land 
Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 541-551(2007); Duncan Kennedy, 
The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race and Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 
85 (2002). 
74 See, e.g., Byrne & Diamond, supra note 73, at 545-48.    
75 See, e.g., id. at 546-47; Jacobus & Lubell,  supra note 3, at 5-6.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note 50, at 3 
(describing as a "distinguishing feature" of the shared equity programs under discussion "the emphasis they place 
on what is shared between individual homeowners and a larger community"). 
76 See Caplin et al., supra note 13, at  9-10; Wilmot, supra note 3 (reporting that Stephen Brown, a finance 
professor at NYU's Stern School, attributed banks' abandonment of "equity participation mortgages" in the U.S. to 
features of contract law). 
77 The product line has since been discontinued, apparently because it was not sufficiently attractive to 
investors.  See Caplin et al., supra note 13, at  9-10 (discussing the Bank of Scotland mortgages and observing that 
"[t]he long and unpredictable nature of the payoff period appears to have been the chief reason that the Bank of 
Scotland withdrew its shared-equity mortgages from the market").  There have also been news reports of 
dissatisfaction among homeowners who used the product.  See infra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.   
78 See Wilmot, supra note 3.   
79 See James R. Hagerty, Product Taps Home Equity Without Taking Out Loan, RealEstateJournal.com 
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for forgoing some of the equity in the home through a lower-priced 
mortgage or a home equity loan.  For example, the Bank of Scotland's SAM 
provided households with interest-free home equity loans upon which no 
payments had to be made until the home was sold or transferred at death.  In 
exchange, the bank received a right to 75% of the home's appreciation.80   
Andrew Caplin and his coauthors have urged adoption of a related 
model for sharing equity, known as "housing partnerships."81  This 
approach makes the homeowner a "managing partner" with full authority 
over the home, but grants certain rights to an "investing partner" who puts 
up half the cash for the property and receives half of the proceeds on 
resale.82   
 
4. Home Value Hedges 
 
While the preceding models contemplate rather specific changes in risk 
bearing, new financial instruments tied to the housing indexes introduced 
earlier83 permit more open-ended trading in housing risk.84  In Spring 2006, 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (now CME Group) began offering 
S&P/Case-Shiller futures and options based on housing indexes.85 CME 
Group currently offers index-based financial instruments are currently 
available for housing markets in ten major cities.86 Because these futures 
and options offer a platform for buying and selling housing market risk, 
they open the door to gains from hedging.87  
A simple example illustrates how hedging based on a housing index 
would work.  Agatha, a homeowner who lives in the town of Doldrums, 
                                                                                                                            
(from the Wall St. J. online), May 11, 2007; see also Rex & Co., www.rexagreement.com.       
80 See Caplin et al., supra note 13, at  9-10. 
81 CAPLIN ET AL., supra note 3. 
82 See generally id. 
83 See text accompanying notes 67-72, supra.   
84 See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, The Pork-Bellies Approach to Housing, N.Y. TIMES (magazine) 92, Sept. 10, 
2006.     
85 See, e.g., Les Christie, New Way to Bet on Real Estate, CNN.money.com, March 22, 2006; Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, CME Housing Futures and Options: Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
www.cme.com/files/housing_faq.pdf; CME Group, S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices Futures and Options: 
Introductory Guide, available at http://www.cme.com/files/cmehousing_brochure.pdf [hereinafter "CME 
Introductory Guide"]; Macro Markets,  http://www.macromarkets.com/csi_housing/sp_caseshiller.asp. Shiller and 
Weiss had previously designed and patented tradable instruments called "macro securities" to facilitate  hedging.  
See SHILLER, supra note 4, at 126-127.   These securities, issued and redeemed in pairs consisting of an "up 
macro" and a "down macro," represent offsetting bets on the movement of the index.  Id.  The "up macro" gains 
value (and the "down macro" loses value) as the index rises; the opposite occurs when the index falls.  Id. at 127 
(presenting an example using a GDP index); see also Michael Pereira, Risk Management for the Age of 
Information, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 715, 729 (2004) (reviewing SHILLER, supra note 4) (discussing this 
example).  Hedgestreet.com, a site which currently allows only mock trading with virtual funds, offers "binaries" 
that facilitate bets on various risks, including housing market movements.  See http://www.hedgestreet.com. 
86 See CME Introductory Guide, supra note 85, at 3.  The cities are Boston, Chicago, Denver, Las Vegas, 
Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Diego, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.  Futures and options settled to 
a "weighted composite index of U.S. real estate prices" are also available.  Id.    
87 See Peter Englund et al., Hedging Housing Risk, 24 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 167 (2002) (estimating 
the potential gains from hedging, using data on housing prices from Stockholm).   
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fears declining home values.  Her house is currently appraised at $200,000, 
and she would like to be able to get that amount back out of it in five years, 
when she plans to move.  An investor, Blake, sells Agatha a put option that 
gives her the right to receive, five years hence, the percentage of $200,000 
that is proportionate to any general decline in housing values within 
Doldrums (as reflected in the local housing index).88 If, five years later, 
Doldrums has experienced a 10% decline in home values, the option that 
Agatha purchased from Blake is worth $20,000 (10% X $200,000).  
Agatha's home should sell for $180,000, assuming its value tracks that of 
the local housing index.89  The $180,000 sales price added to the $20,000 
payout from Blake amounts to the $200,000 Agatha originally paid for the 
house; she has been able to perfectly hedge the risk of a market decline.90   
Agatha could also transact with respect to the local housing market's 
upside potential.  For example, Agatha could sell Cody a call option that 
gives him the right to receive $2,000 for each percentage point that the local 
housing market index rises by the end of the five-year period. If, at the end 
of five years, home prices in Doldrums have risen 10%, Agatha should 
receive $220,000 when she sells her home, again assuming its value moves 
in concert with the Doldrums housing index. Agatha's gain of $20,000 on 
the home sale will cover her required payout to Cody and leave her with her 
original investment of $200,000.  In the meantime, Agatha has been able to 
use the proceeds from the sale of the call option to pursue other investment 
opportunities or reduce her housing (or other) debt; she might even have 
used some of it to pay for the put option she purchased from Blake.91 
Of course, most homeowners do not plan a move on a date certain in the 
future, but rather wish to be protected against price fluctuations over the 
entire (unknown) period that they will own the house, however long or short 
it turns out to be. Thus, short-term calls and puts must either be made 
available on a rolling basis or triggered by life events (such as sales of the 
home) that are unpredictable in the individual case but predictable in the 
aggregate.92 Creating workable financial instruments also requires attention 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 3, at 82.  I assume here that Agatha's actions cannot much affect the overall 
housing market in Doldrums.  This simple example also assumes that Doldrums is a single housing market for 
indexing purposes, although indexing can instead break up a town into smaller units, such as zip codes. 
89 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the risk that, for reasons out of a homeowner's control, the home's 
price will not track the local housing index. 
90 This simple example ignores the impact of inflation. For a discussion of the interaction between inflation 
and hedging, see, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 3, at 96-98; Shiller & Weiss, supra note 4, at 31-32.  
91 Agatha might transact with the same investor (say, Blake) as to both the call and the put option.  Such an 
arrangement would be identical to Blake buying futures in the local housing market from Agatha -- essentially, he 
would be obligated to buy, and Agatha would be obligated to sell, the portion of her equity tied to the local 
housing market to him for $200,000 on a date five years hence.  See Shiller & Weiss, supra note 4 (discussing the 
use of puts to protect against downside risk and contrasting them with futures that would involve transacting as to 
both the upside and the downside).    
92 See Shiller & Weiss, supra note 4, at 38-44.  Shiller & Weiss make detailed estimates of annual premiums 
for life-event triggered home equity insurance under a variety of assumptions, finding in some cases that a few 
hundred dollars annually would be sufficient to provide complete downside protection for a $100,000 house 
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to many other design elements, such as the appropriate construction, 
updating, and use of indexes,93 the treatment of inflation,94 the permissible 
timing for exercising an option,95 and the timing and form of payments and 
payouts.96 Although these issues are complex and difficult, past and 
ongoing work to address them suggests that they are not beyond the 
technical capacity of financial innovators. 
A more formidable challenge is achieving widespread acceptance of 
these new hedges. While it is possible that individual homeowners could 
trade in futures and options directly, most households' access to these 
housing risk markets would have to be mediated through a user-friendly 
interface provided by an insurer, lender, or other entity. For example, an 
insurance company could serve as a conduit in matching buyers and sellers 
of housing market risk, rather than having to price risk itself.97  
Alternatively, the offloading of risk might be built into the mortgage 
instrument.98  Or, as I will suggest below, a separate entity could develop a 
user-friendly interface to seamlessly deliver home risk transactions to 
homebuyers.99   
Shiller anticipated that the use of new risk management tools like 
housing futures and options would develop in two distinct stages -- first 
adopted by sophisticated investors, and later adapted for use by ordinary 
consumers.100  According to early reports, the trade volume for the new 
housing market securities has been relatively light.101 It is possible that 
advances in the instruments themselves, such as a recent extension in the 
                                                                                                                            
(assuming no indexing for inflation).  See Shiller & Weiss, supra note 4, at 43-44 & tbls. 4&5.  They also 
calculate the cost of fixed-term put options of one or two years, which are more costly.  See id. at 36-37& tbls. 
1&2.  In all cases, the price would depend on the extent of protection and on the past behavior of the local housing 
market.    
93 See infra Part II.B. 
94 See supra note 90. 
95 These timing decisions would include the minimum holding period before a homeowner could cash in on 
changes in the home's value, the length of the option period, and whether the homeowner could exercise the 
option  independent of specified events, such as moving out or selling the home.     
96 The investor's initial payment to the homeowner for the purchase of upside potential could be made in a 
lump sum, paid out over time, or could constitute savings built into the mortgage itself.  See infra Part I.C.3.  
Likewise, payment for coverage against downside loss might be made either in a lump sum for the duration of the 
homeowners' time in the home, or in the form of annual premia.  Compare Shiller & Weiss, supra note 4, at 43-44 
(focusing on annual premia in exploring the potential for home equity insurance) with Andrew Caplin, et al., 
Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project, Yale International Center for Finance, Working Paper No. 03-12 (May 3, 
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=41014 (explaining the use of a one-time payment, such as a 
homeowner makes for title insurance, in the Syracuse pilot project).  The one-time payment removes concerns 
about strategic policy cancellation, a topic discussed in Shiller & Weiss, supra.   
97 Shiller & Weiss, supra at 33-34 (discussing "pass-through  futures and options").  
98 See Juerg Syz, Paolo Vanini, & Marco Salvi, Property Derivatives and Index-Linked Mortgages (August 
31, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927888.    
99 See text accompanying notes 133-134, infra.   
100 SHILLER, supra note 3, at 201.   
101 See Gail Liberman, Hedging Real Estate:  The Derivatives Are Here; Are They The Answer?  FINANCIAL 
ADVISOR MAGAZINE, Nov. 2006, available at 
http://www.financialadvisormagazine.com/past_issues.php?id_content=3&idArticle=1365&idPastIssue=115 
(discussing reasons for low trade volume during the first several months that housing derivatives were available). 
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length of their terms, may help to make them more attractive to investors.102  
But it is also possible that assumptions about the order of progression need 
to be revised:  To spur interest among investors, it may first be necessary to 
produce widespread demand among homeowners through the development 
of a comprehensible and user-friendly risk management interface.103  
 
 
II.   INTRODUCING H2.0 
 
As the foregoing survey illustrates, efforts to decouple investment risk 
from housing consumption have taken diverse forms.  While all of these 
innovations respond to the fact that the homeownership bundle 
encompasses investment components that may not well serve the needs of 
homeowners, these programs have been designed as adjuncts to traditional 
homeownership.  None of the existing models returns to first principles to 
ask whether homeownership itself should be modified in a fundamental 
way.  In developing H2.0, I hope to do just that.   
I will start by outlining the contents of the H2.0 bundle, which contains 
only a subset of the investment component presently packaged with 
homeownership.  Next, I discuss a central design issue in producing (or 
approximating) that newly configured bundle -- the disaggregation of onsite 
and offsite risks. Third, I discuss the advantages for homebuyers of access 
to such a reduced-risk bundle.  Finally, I discuss the advantages of making 
that new bundle seamlessly available to homebuyers as an off-the-rack 
tenure form with its own default settings.   
 
A.  Configuring H2.0 
 
As the discussion in the previous Part suggested, there is a large gap 
between the constrained housing consumption opportunities available to 
renters and the full-blown package of investment and consumption that 
homeowners purchase as a matter of course.  If we were to approach the 
problem of optimally designing homeownership for modern metropolitan 
conditions with fresh eyes, what would we include as standard elements in 
the bundle?  Figure 1 sketches one answer to this question, drawing on a 
                                                 
102 See id. (quoting and summarizing views that the one-year term limit for hedges represented a significant 
drawback for investors);  CME Group Extends Offerings of S&P/Case-Shiller Housing Contracts (Aug. 7, 2007) 
available at  http://cmegroup.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=603 (reporting on the extension of housing 
future and option terms to periods up to five years).   
103 Such a user-friendly interface could also help to create positive publicity for the development of the 
economic instruments, which might be viewed in isolation as speculative bets against local housing markets. See 
Pereira, supra note 85, at 733 (noting negative reactions to prediction markets introduced by the Pentagon's 
Defense Advance Research Programs Agency in 2003 and observing that "public relations could be as important 
as economics in selling macro markets to the investing public"). 
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functional understanding of property as a container for collecting an owner's 
inputs and the resulting outcomes.   
 
 
  Figure 1:  Components of Homeownership 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1, traditional homeownership is made up of both 
consumption and investment components.104  Although these two categories 
are presented as distinct, there is actually some overlap between them.  
Because the consumption stream extends over time, the as-yet-unused 
portion of that stream at any given point in time represents a form of 
savings.105  The value of those savings -- that is, the enjoyment that the 
household will realize through future consumption of housing -- can 
fluctuate. In this sense, at least, even an intensely consumption-minded 
homeowner who plans to live in her home for the rest of her life is 
nevertheless an investor.106   
The dashed line cutting through the "consumption" box distinguishes 
between elements of consumption achievable through renting and those 
unique to homeownership.   If leaseholds were changed in certain ways, this 
dashed  line (and the right edge of the "renting" bar) would move further to 
the right.  However, the distinction would not disappear entirely, at least to 
the extent that "ownership" continues to carry some consumption cachet by 
conferring higher status and other benefits.  As noted above, enjoyment of  
ownership-related consumption benefits may require a certain degree of 
investment.  In other words, there may be no conceptually coherent tenure 
form that would snap off cleanly at the right edge of the consumption box; 
                                                 
104 See supra note 16. 
105 Durable goods are commonly understood to contain such a savings component.  See ALAN E.H. SPEIGHT, 
CONSUMPTION, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND LIQUIDITY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 37 (1989).  
106 The same might be said of a tenant during a given lease-term, though the tenant may be able to appeal to 
the landlord for corrections to any downward trend in consumption value.   
 
consumption 
 
 
       
investment    
     
onsite        offsite 
 -----  traditional homeownership ----- 
minimum H2.0 ownership 
renting 
24 Fennell [11-Oct-07 
to get all of those benefits, one must pick up more of the homeownership 
bundle.   
The dashed line running through the "investment" box indicates that the 
investment portion of homeownership can be subdivided into volatility 
occasioned by onsite factors and that occasioned by offsite factors. As 
Figure 1 indicates, I propose that H2.0 ownership include, at a minimum, 
the investment component that corresponds to onsite factors.  Defending 
this particular break point requires taking a closer look at the investment 
component, as shown in Figure 2.   
 
 
Figure 2:  Investment Factors 
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As the lefthand side of Figure 2 illustrates, most of the onsite factors lie 
under the individual household's control.  Some onsite risks lie outside the 
household's control, however, such as fires not caused by negligent 
behavior on the part of the householders.   Conceptually, homeownership 
requires that the household bear at least the gains and losses associated with 
controllable factors.  Pragmatically, including these controllable factors in 
the homeownership bundle seems critical to attracting investment interest in 
other parts of the investment package.  The argument for including all 
onsite factors in the H2.0 bundle, including those that are not within the 
household's control, is that the individual household is in the best position to 
procure insurance against such eventualities. Because the risk will play out 
(or not) on the individual owner's parcel, a simple transaction between the 
homeowner and the insurer suffices.   
As the righthand side of Figure 2 indicates, offsite factors also exhibit 
some heterogeneity.  While it is fair to say that none of these offsite 
influences lies within the control of individual households, homeowners as 
a group may have significant control over block level, neighborhood, and 
local conditions through the use of norms, politics, exit options, and direct 
participation in the collective production of local public goods. While 
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attempts to exercise this control can often be socially damaging, some 
homeowner efforts help to build social capital and improve neighborhood 
and local conditions.  This raises the question of whether allowing 
homeowners to avoid investment exposure to the subset of offsite factors 
that are amenable to collective control would make them less effective 
citizens and neighbors.  My answer to this question is a qualified no, but the 
question is a difficult one that I will take up in some depth in Part IV.   
To sum up, the standard H2.0 package would include the usual 
consumption incidents of homeownership, as well as the investment 
exposure relating to onsite factors.  It would not include, as a default  
matter, the investment risk relating to offsite factors -- although homebuyers 
would be free to add back in as much of that risk as they wished to assume. 
 
B.  Disaggregating Onsite and Offsite Influences 
 
The theoretically clear distinction between onsite and offsite influences 
on home value changes featured in my conceptual sketch of H2.0 cannot, of 
course, be drawn with such precision in practice.  Although housing market 
indexes represent one way to draw a line between onsite and offsite 
influences on home value changes, they are not the only way to approach 
the problem, and they come with some difficulties of their own.  The basic 
concern to which housing market indexes respond has been discussed under 
the rubric of "moral hazard" in the literature -- the possibility that a 
homeowner, after insuring against a loss or granting the proceeds of a future 
gain, will work less  hard to avoid the loss or produce the gain.107 However, 
because some of the responses to moral hazard produce hazards that run in 
the opposite direction, the problem can be regarded more generically as one 
of disaggregation.   
Three basic ways to go about disaggregating onsite and offsite  
influences on home values are summarized in Figure 3, along with some of 
their advantages and disadvantages.  These strategies can be combined to 
produce additional alternatives.   
                                                 
107 See, e.g., Shiller & Weiss, supra note 45, at 6-11.  An adverse selection problem may also be implicated 
if the payoff structure tends to attract those who are especially likely to experience subpar market outcomes.  See, 
e.g., Shiller & Weiss, supra note 4, at 25-26 (referencing this "selection-bias problem").  
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Figure 3:  Disaggregating Onsite and Offsite Influences 
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Indexing.  The advantages of housing market indexes have already been 
noted.  Indexes facilitate investment and trading, help to aggregate 
information, and avoid the moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
that might otherwise plague efforts to reassign housing value risk.   
Importantly for this paper's purposes, indexing also seems to fairly neatly 
(though not perfectly) distinguish between the onsite influences for which 
we want to leave homeowners responsible and the offsite influences that 
they might more efficiently leave to others.  Also important is the index's 
ease of administration. Although costly to construct in the first instance, 
once in place it generates clear-cut answers about payoffs.   
The construction of a workable local housing index implicates myriad 
technical factors that lie beyond the scope of this paper.108  However, it is 
helpful to note one key tension:  The thinner an index is sliced, the more 
capable it will be of drawing fine distinctions among homes, but the less 
well it will work as a basis for trading. The smaller the number of 
observations in a particular index and the fewer the market participants 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 3, at 24-27 (discussing the potential for distortion of indexes through 
speculative trading); 116-200 (discussing a variety of issues relating to the construction, use, and updating of 
indexes).    
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trading on that index, the less liquid and accurate it will be.109  
The same design tension relates to the problem of successfully 
disaggregating onsite and offsite influences on value.  An index that 
perfectly tracked one particular home would of course reintroduce the full 
consideration of onsite factors.  At the other extreme, a nationwide housing 
index that aggregated all owner-occupied housing would do a poor job of 
capturing regional and local offsite influences.  In between these extremes, 
there are questions about whether any given housing index will pick up too 
much of what owners are doing on their own parcels (such as a home 
improvement trend within a particular neighborhood)110 or too little of what 
is happening outside the parcel (such as highly localized undesirable land 
uses).111  
These concerns illustrate "basis risk," which Shiller and Weiss define 
"as the risk that fluctuations in the home price index will not match up well 
with fluctuations in the price of the home that are beyond the homeowners' 
control."112 Basis risk is a real concern, because it could keep risk 
management products from working as advertised for homeowners.  First, 
consider a household that purchases downside protection only.  Assume the 
home's value falls for reasons that have nothing to do with parcel-specific 
actions or omissions on the part of the household.  Ideally, the index would 
fall by the same amount.  But if it did not, and if payouts were made based 
on the index alone, the difference between the loss (if any) shown by the 
index and the actual loss the household experienced on reselling their home 
would amount to a failure in the product's protection. 
Basis risk takes on an even more worrisome cast when the household 
sells upside potential, either on its own or in combination with the purchase 
of downside protection.  Consider a scenario in which the index reflects a 
larger gain than is experienced by the homeowner, and the difference 
between the resale price as actually experienced and as predicted by the 
index is an artifact of imprecision in the index rather than the result of any 
                                                 
109 This issue affects the design of markets in many areas.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd 
Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1352 (2007) (noting 
the concern that some prediction markets will have too few participants, "resulting in low liquidity and therefore 
lower reliability" and discussing how to address that concern);  James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the 
Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 645-48 (2000) (exploring the tradeoff between 
making tradable environmental currencies "fat and sloppy" and "thin and bland").   
110 See SHILLER, supra note 3, at 166-68 (discussing the concern that home improvements could affect the 
housing index, but concluding that this factor would not be very significant given the dollar value of home 
improvements relative to home values generally).  It is possible, however, that the shift to H2.0 ownership might 
itself influence household investments in improvements.  
111 See Christian A.L. Hilber, Neighborhood Externality Risk and the Homeownership Status of Properties, 
57 J. URB. ECON. 213, 218 (2005) (suggesting, given the role of neighborhood externality risk, that a real estate 
price index of the sort advocated by Shiller and Weiss "ought to be neighborhood specific if it is to be 
successful").   
112 Shiller & Weiss, supra note 45, at 2.   Basis risk might also work against the investor.  A marked 
relaxation in maintenance norms in a given area, for example, might cause the index to drop, even though the 
individual households who lowered their maintenance standards would be responsible for the value change.   
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acts or omissions by the household.  If settlements were determined by the 
index alone, the homeowner would have to pay out the share of gains 
reflected in the index even though she did not realize those gains. An even 
more catastrophic manifestation of basis risk would occur if the index  
showed a gain while the home itself actually sold at a loss.  Not only would 
an index-based payout system fail to protect against downside loss, but it 
would add insult to injury by requiring someone in a loss position to make a 
payout for gains that were never experienced.    
Accounting.  Instead of relying on an index, disaggregation of onsite and 
offsite factors might be attempted on a property-specific basis.  Before 
figuring the home's gain or loss for purposes of payments, additions or 
debits could be made based on documented acts or omissions of the 
homeowner.113  This approach avoids basis risk, but introduces costly 
measurement and verification problems. It also does not directly facilitate 
the development of derivatives markets for widespread investing and 
trading in housing market risk.   
Directing. Instead of disaggregating onsite and offsite impacts by 
counting up impacts or applying an index -- strategies intended to leave the 
risk associated with onsite changes on the homeowner -- it would also be 
possible for a program to direct onsite inputs.114    
A spectrum of approaches are possible.  At one extreme, an arrangement 
could give direct control over certain onsite matters to the investor (or agent 
thereof) -- an approach that both erodes homeowner autonomy and requires 
costly interventions. Instead of taking over onsite functions directly, a 
program might instead regulate inputs by requiring and prohibiting certain 
actions.  This alternative requires monitoring and some sort of enforcement 
for violations.  In some settings, such a directing approach may be able to 
piggyback on an existing land use control regime, such as a homeowners' 
association or local zoning authority.  If the HOA or zoning authority could 
be counted on to enforce certain kinds of violations, then it would 
essentially guarantee a certain set of inputs for investors without the need 
for any direct intervention or regulation.  It must be borne in mind, of 
course, that these land use regimes can themselves cut deeply into 
homeowner autonomy and may have other negative societal effects as well. 
At the other end of the spectrum, a program might simply provide a 
schedule of commonly recommended or permitted actions, with specific 
dollar values attached to each.115 A household that engaged in listed actions 
                                                 
113This seems to be the approach taken by Rex & Company in the Rex Agreement, supra note 3.  See 
http://www.rexagreement.com/index.php/rex/who_we_serve_homeowners_faqs/ (explaining that homeowners 
would be credited for improvements, based on an appraisal, before calculating the company's share).    
114 Equity sharing arrangements designed to provide affordable housing seem to have made use of this 
approach.  See Davis, supra note 50, at 96-98. 
115 Larger or more unique proposed improvements might be handled through a preapproval process.   
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in accordance with articulated standards would be credited in specified 
amounts, while a household that failed to undertake recommended 
maintenance efforts would be debited as specified.  Autonomy would be 
preserved because the actions and omissions in question would be priced 
rather than required or prohibited.  Moreover, if the schedule were 
accurately tied to impacts on resale values, it could be educational for less 
experienced homeowners or could help to counter the unrealistic predictions 
of overoptimistic would-be home improvers. 
Aside from the high cost of administration, such a model would 
accomplish a very significant shifting of risk relating to onsite factors from 
the homeowner to the investor. Because risk mediates between specific 
inputs and market outcomes, the actual effect of any given act or omission 
might not line up to the amount credited or debited.  On one hand, this 
might seem to erode the meaning of homeownership.  However, some 
owners might highly value the greater payoff certainty that such ex ante 
specification would provide.   
Hybrid Approaches.  There are many ways that the approaches above 
might be combined.  One approach would use local housing indexes to 
generate raw payoff figures that could then be adjusted as needed to address 
basis risk. An additional layer of insurance might be used to accomplish 
this, as Shiller and Weiss have suggested.116  Payouts on the "basis" 
insurance could either be based on verification of differential local 
conditions, or it might instead be based on an investigation that rules out the 
possibility that negative onsite factors -- such as neglect, destruction, an 
extraordinarily rapid sale, or a sale that was not conducted at arms length -- 
were responsible for the outcome.   
Some elements of the "directing" approach might also be incorporated 
into such a hybrid approach.  The insurer against basis risk in this story 
could develop schedules of recommended maintenance and acceptable sales 
practices, which the homeowner might be required to follow (and 
document) in order to later make out a basis risk claim.  As an alternative 
method for dealing with moral hazard at the time of sale, recovery under the 
insurance policy could be made contingent on the homeowner extending the 
insurer a right of first refusal -- effectively, a call option -- to acquire the 
home at a price slightly higher than the proposed sales price during a 
temporally constrained window.117   
 
                                                 
116 Shiller & Weiss, supra note 4, at 26 (observing that "there could be complete insurance of the price 
change that is due to aggregate market conditions and coinsurance for the deviation of the home price from the 
price change inferred by the index").   
117 See CAPLIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 137 (incorporating a right of first refusal with a premium and a time 
limit into the housing partnership model).  The reason for the premium and the short time window is to minimize 
any detrimental impact on would-be buyers that might discourage them from writing a contract on an H2.0 home.  
See id.       
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C.  Advantages for Homeowners 
 
At this point, it is helpful to briefly summarize the benefits H2.0 could 
offer homeowners:  reduced risk, affordability, and increased portfolio 
choice.  These advantages have, of course, received considerable attention 
in the literature surrounding the programs and policies surveyed in Part I.C, 
although many of those models have focused on one or two of these 
advantages rather than the full set. I will reserve for Part IV a discussion of 
larger societal impacts, both positive and negative, that might accompany 
the widespread adoption of the H2.0 form of homeownership. 
 
1. Reduced Risk  
 
The advantage of protecting homeowners against the risk of downward 
housing market trends requires little elaboration.  Not only does risk 
buffering protect current homeowners against negative outcomes, it also can 
be important in inducing potential homebuyers to enter into homeownership 
in the first place.  In addition, the greater portfolio choice facilitated by 
H2.0, discussed below, carries a strong potential to reduce not only the risk 
of an actual loss on the home, but also the risk of substandard returns on the 
home investment.  Finally, the fact that risk is reduced not only for the 
homeowner but also for the lender, as explained below,118 helps to increase 
the affordability of debt financing.   
Some caveats are in order, however.  The extent of risk reduction 
possible through H2.0 depends on the household's exposure under 
traditional homeownership. As already noted, households that can 
accurately predict that they will stay within a local housing market in which 
price movements are closely correlated can use the purchase of a home as a 
hedge against future price increases.  Staying within the same local housing 
market can also help to protect households from falling home prices; if the 
prices of the current and future home move together, the loss in the current 
home's value will be compensated by a lower purchase price for the future 
home.  Households' use of home purchases as risk hedges can be understood 
as a response to incomplete markets -- with fully developed housing risk 
markets, the purchase of risk hedges and homes could be made 
independently.119  But to the extent this hedging is successful and does not 
produce too many distortions in housing consumption (both of which are 
open questions), it reduces the advantages available from H2.0.120 
Second, the free trading of location-specific housing risk could enable 
                                                 
118 See text accompanying notes 124-127, infra. 
119 See Han, supra note 5, at 5; Banks et al., supra note 17. 
120 See Han, supra note 5, at 5. 
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households not only to offload unwanted risk but also to take on additional 
risk within a particular location. My analysis has implicitly assumed that the 
investors taking on location-specific risk from homeowners would hold it in 
relatively diversified portfolios, but in the absence of regulatory constraints, 
households could use the instruments underlying H2.0 to become even more 
heavily invested in their neighborhoods than they are presently.  Another 
possibility is that households who do reduce their exposure to offsite 
sources of home site volatility will compensate for the enhanced safety in 
that domain with increased risk-taking in other domains.121 For example, 
households that have purchased protection against the downside impacts of 
offsite factors might accept more risk on the stock market or job market 
than they otherwise would.  Perhaps more likely, they might pour larger 
amounts of money into idiosyncratic onsite improvements with highly 
variable (or frankly unpromising) returns.     
 
2.  Affordability   
 
A homebuyer who can sell off some of a home's potential gains will 
have a powerful new instrument for enhancing her buying power.  In short, 
she can finance her home using equity as well as debt.122   The ability to get 
more house for the same money also means freer access to premium public 
services that are effectively rationed through the housing stock. Greater 
affordability will translate into different results for different consumers.  For 
some, it will make the purchase of a home possible, for others it will result 
in lower mortgage (or other) indebtedness, and for others, it will free up 
funds to be invested elsewhere.  
Because downside protection requires a payment from the homebuyer to 
the investor, it is not generally viewed as enhancing affordability.  Indeed, it 
would erase some of the affordability gains of the sale of upside 
potential.123  But purchasing protection against downward price movements 
may have an offsetting benefit:  reducing mortgage costs.124   Part of the 
risk that mortgage lenders presently accept is that the housing market will 
decline and leave them with assets that, in the event of borrower default, are 
insufficient to repay the loan.125 Because declining market conditions also 
                                                 
121 I thank Amitai Aviram for drawing my attention to this possibility.  Such compensatory risk-taking has 
been observed in other settings See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, RISK 59 (1995) ("Because people compensate for 
externally imposed safety measures, the risk regulators and safety engineers are chronically disappointed in the 
impact that they make on the accident toll.").  For example, drivers required to wear seatbelts may drive more 
aggressively than they would if unbelted, erasing many of the gains that seatbelts could theoretically provide.  See 
id. at 113-28. 
122 See Caplin et al., supra note 13, at 1. 
123 If houses generally appreciate over time, however, the sale of the upside should exceed the premiums 
required to insure against the downside, producing net increases in affordability. 
124 See Syz et al., supra note 98. 
125 See id.  
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increase the probability of borrower default, this represents a major source 
of exposure for lenders.  Lenders bank against that exposure in part through 
underwriting requirements but also through higher loan charges that help to 
cover the nonperforming loans.   
If the risk of market decline can be removed from the equation for both 
borrowers and lenders, lenders are helped in two ways.  First, borrower 
defaults become less likely, because borrowers can sell at a loss in a 
declining market and receive a payment that covers the proportion of the 
loss that is attributable to market decline.  Second, if the borrower does 
default, the lender can collect that payment on the borrower's behalf, 
making default less costly for the lender.126  These risk reductions would be 
expected to translate into lower-priced mortgages for homebuyers.  This 
will have an additional, beneficial feedback effect:  The less costly the 
mortgage, the  less likely it is that the borrower will default.    
Interestingly, the cost savings for the lender -- and hence for the 
borrower -- will be greatest for the highest risk borrowers.127  These 
financially constrained borrowers are also more likely to elect to sell upside 
potential, which will generate additional cost savings and further reduce the 
chance of default. Thus, H2.0 offers the potential to make lower cost loans 
on less costly homes available to the riskiest classes of homebuyers. As a 
result, H2.0 offers at least a partial response to one of the largest fears 
associated with the prospect of increased regulation of subprime lending -- 
that it will make mortgage loans to the most credit-challenged homebuyers 
infeasible.128 The extra security that H2.0 provides to lenders could help to 
keep the loan supply to credit-challenged homebuyers from drying up even 
if constraints are placed on the pricing and structuring of loans.129   
I do not mean to suggest that H2.0 will resolve all problems of subprime 
lending.  On the contrary, new regulatory protections might be required to 
keep lenders from becoming too complacent about the possibility of 
                                                 
126 See id; see also Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, Mortgage Default Risk and Real Estate Prices: The Use 
of Index Based Futures and Options in Real Estate, 7 J. HOUSING RESEARCH 243 (1996) (discussing potential for 
lenders themselves to purchase home equity insurance products). 
127 See Syz et al., supra note 98. 
128 See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Subprime Homesick Blues, THE NEW YORKER, April 9, 2007 ("We do need 
more regulatory vigilance, but banning subprime loans will protect the interests of some at the expense of limiting 
credit for subprime borrowers in general."); Damian Paletta, Regulators Tighten Subprime-Lending Rules, WALL 
ST. J., June 29, 2007 (discussing tension between consumer protection and limiting of consumer choices).   
129 I take no position here on the merits of increased regulation of subprime lending.  In any case, steps in 
that direction are already underway. Recently, the federal financial regulatory agencies issued a "final statement 
on subprime mortgage lending" that provided new guidelines for federally-regulated institutions offering certain 
categories of subprime loan products, including those with adjustable rate features, low documentation of income, 
and prepayment penalties. See Department of the Treasury (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), Federal 
Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Department of the Treasury (Office of Thrift 
Supervision, and National Credit Union Administration, Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, issued June 
29, 2007, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2007/20070629.default.htm. Among 
other things, the guidelines call for underwriting standards that include an assessment of the borrower's ability to 
pay not only the initial rate, but also the adjusted rate.  See id. at 12. 
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borrower default in setting underwriting standards, given  H2.0's capacity to 
lower their exposure in the event of market downturns.  But because H2.0 
leaves more money and less risk on the table, homebuyers stand to be made 
better off. 
     
3.  Increased Portfolio Choice.    
 
H2.0's potential to give homeowners greater portfolio choice interacts 
with both affordability and risk reduction.  Money that would otherwise 
have to be invested in a home in order to enjoy a given housing 
consumption stream will not have to be so invested, because it is provided 
by an outside investor who is purchasing some of the home's upside 
potential. These savings can be invested elsewhere, perhaps in more 
diversified holdings.  Alternatively, the saved funds can go to reduce 
mortgage indebtedness on the home -- a move which does not increase 
diversification,130 although it reduces the risk of default.  A very real 
concern, discussed at more length below, is that many homebuyers will get 
neither of these benefits because they will still choose to purchase the most 
expensive house for which they can qualify for financing.  They will then 
enjoy heightened consumption benefits (because they can qualify for a more 
expensive home if they sell off the upside potential), but will receive no 
portfolio diversification and no diminution in debt load.   
Given these possibilities, it cannot be confidently claimed, at least 
absent design features that would constrain homebuyer choice, that 
portfolios will necessarily become less house-heavy, more diversified, or 
more prudent as a result of H2.0.  Some homeowners may even expand 
their holdings in the undiversified local housing market by taking on some 
of the risk of their neighbors.  Instead, it can only be said that consumers 
will have more choice in how they allocate dollars to different portions of 
their portfolios.  At the same time, optimizing the portfolio arguably 
becomes less important if consumers avail themselves of the downside 
protection H2.0 will offer, which provides at least some of the risk 
buffering that portfolio diversification would be able to provide.  
 
D.  Off the Rack or Build from Scratch? 
 
 If shifting risk from homeowners to investors can produce important 
gains, the question remains how best to go about accomplishing those 
transfers.  As discussed above, mechanisms for reallocating homeownership 
                                                 
130 If a household with funds invested elsewhere uses some of those funds to pay down a mortgage, its 
holdings actually become less diversified.  See Chatterjee, supra note 16, at 4-5.  In the scenario in the text, the 
extra money put into the mortgage is coming not from otherwise invested funds but rather is raised by selling off 
some of the home's upside potential.  The dollar amount invested in the home does not change.   
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risk have long been under development and, while some important design 
issues remain, the remaining technical problems do not seem 
insurmountable.  Thus, with a few modifications, tools that already exist or 
that are in the works could be used to reach the target that property theory 
suggests is the right one -- a narrowing of mandatory homeowner 
investment risk to onsite factors, which are either under the homeowner's 
control or efficient for the homeowner to insure against personally. What, 
then, would be the point of introducing a new tenure form like H2.0?  If we 
already have (or will soon have) the technical capacity to reshape home 
investment risk in endlessly flexible ways, why not let the market supply an 
assortment of products for modifying traditional homeownership, and let 
consumers choose exactly which ones they wish to use?  In theory, the raw 
materials of risk transfer could be used to build from scratch something that 
resembles my idea of H2.0 as well as any number of alternatives.   
In the next subsections, I will discuss the advantages of adopting a new, 
off-the-rack version of homeownership, and discuss the extent to which 
such a new tenure form would require legal changes.131  
 
1. Advantages of the H2.0 Tenure Package 
 
My case for the H2.0 package as a new starting point for 
homeownership is based on three considerations -- its compatibility with 
property theory, its ability to serve as a focal point for the further 
development of law, and its cognitive role in facilitating widespread 
acceptance of new risk allocation arrangements.   
First, introducing H2.0 as a new starting point is theoretically more 
coherent than altering, piecemeal, a homeownership form that no longer 
serves the needs of most households. To see this point, consider a fictitious 
municipality, Stockville, where land buyers are required to purchase one 
share of stock in the county's largest enterprise (a sock factory, say) for each 
square foot of land they purchase.  As long as the stock purchase adds little 
cost or risk to the real estate package, it might be tolerated.  But if the 
company's stock begins to skyrocket and fluctuate wildly, we would expect 
bright minds to quickly seize on the idea of separating the investment in 
socks from the investment in Stockville real estate.   
In this case, it is easy to see that scaling back the Stockville real estate 
bundle so that it no longer includes a stock purchase requirement would be 
                                                 
131 Property forms, which are limited in number, are often described as being standardized or "off the rack."  
See, e.g., Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 621-22 (2002); infra notes 136-137 and 
accompanying text.   However, arrangements capable of reducing information or transaction costs may also be 
created through standardized contract language or statutes.  See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Voting 
in Corporate Law, 26 J. OF L. & ECON. 395, 401 (1983)  (describing corporate law's "off-the-rack principles" as a 
kind of standard form contract); Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1175 (2006).   
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a more coherent approach than leaving the bundle unchanged and inventing 
elaborate devices to alter it after the fact.  Of course, unbundling offsite 
risks from homeownership is not as simple as suspending a senseless stock 
purchase requirement.  But from a theoretical perspective, the goal should 
be the same -- a sensibly configured bundle delivered seamlessly to the 
purchaser, without extraneous risk attached.  Risk transfer mechanisms 
should serve only as a means to accomplishing that end. 
Here, we can see how H2.0 differs from the array of products that have 
previously been developed to selectively subtract subsets of upside or 
downside risk from homeownership. The category of risks that are 
offloaded by default through H2.0 are not limited to either downside or 
upside volatility, nor cabined by reference to particular social ills, nor 
constrained based on the identities of those who will take the other side of 
the transaction.  Instead, the central organizing principle behind H2.0 is a 
distinction between onsite and offsite factors affecting home value that is 
based on the owner's scope of effective control.  While homeowners may 
want to invest in offsite factors (just as residents of Stockville might wish to 
invest in their local sock factory), that investment should entail a separate, 
conscious transaction.   
Second, a new tenure form solves a coordination problem by providing 
a focal point around which law and shared social and cultural 
understandings can evolve.132  Most immediately, the existence of such a 
focal point would facilitate debate about the merits of changing the risk 
allocation that accompanies homeownership. To date, the numerous 
existing and proposed models that change how homeownership risk is 
allocated are difficult to even converse about in an efficient way, because 
they all have different names and slightly different purposes. A theoretically 
coherent bundle with well-known default settings can offer a more unified 
springboard for public discourse.   
Moving forward, a single focal point would facilitate the orderly 
evolution of law. Just as ownership forms such as condominiums, 
cooperatives, and common interest communities have become 
comprehensible legal categories around which law has developed, so too 
could a new version of homeownership serve as a centerpoint around which 
new legal understandings could develop. In addition, providing a unified 
label for a new tenure regime will have significant advantages in terms of 
consumer comprehension.  Consistent with the development of H2.0 as its 
                                                 
132 I am grateful to Noah Zatz for discussions on this point.  The idea that law itself can offer a focal point 
capable of solving private coordination problems has been explored in, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point 
Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000).  My focus here is on the coordination games inherent in 
the development of the law and in the production of shared social understandings that a focal point (whether 
provided by the law itself or by third parties) might address.  See id. at 1658-72 (discussing and comparing focal 
points provided by third parties and by the law).    
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own focal point, I would not recommend integrating it into the familiar 
vehicles of insurance policies or mortgages, at least initially.133  Instead, a 
separate entity would market this tenure form to consumers and take care of 
executing the necessary option agreements to alienate upside and downside 
equity seamlessly (from the consumer's perspective).134  
Third, and most important, without a new paradigm for homeownership, 
the widespread adoption of mechanisms designed to alter home value risk 
seems unlikely. Having a comprehensive new mental template as a starting 
point will be crucial to effecting such a paradigm shift.  As discussed in Part 
III, cognitive features relating to the processing of risks, gains, and losses 
pose significant obstacles to incremental do-it-yourself change in risk-
bearing. Creating a new default package with pricing that already reflects 
the shedding of investment risk is likely to be essential in making an 
alternative to traditional homeownership cognitively viable.   
 
2. Legal Implications of a New Tenure Form 
  
I have used the phrase "new tenure form" throughout this paper without 
specifying what exactly that would mean in legal terms. One possibility 
would be the insertion of a new possessory estate into the existing ranks of 
freehold property forms.  Indeed, this might seem to be an almost inevitable 
implication of the arguments I have been making. But, on closer 
examination, creating a new possessory estate is wholly unnecessary and 
would only serve to introduce new costs and complexities.  
To see this, suppose that the H2.0 estate were created by legislative or 
judicial fiat tomorrow.  A current owner of a fee simple, Owen, would now 
have the legal capacity to convey an H2.0 estate to a homebuyer, Henrietta, 
while separately conveying the offsite investment component to an investor, 
Ivor.  So far so good.  But notice what happens when Henrietta wants to sell 
her home to a new buyer, Blanche. If Blanche wants to purchase a fee 
simple estate (as many homebuyers presumably will continue to do, even 
after H2.0 becomes available), she must transact with both Henrietta and 
Ivor in order to regain the divided pieces of that estate. The need to transact 
with multiple parties is likely to raise transaction costs considerably.   
It is no easier for Blanche to purchase the H2.0 estate in isolation. 
Assuming Blanche's willingness to pay for the home is based in part on 
offsite factors, the gain or loss that the sale generates for Henrietta directly 
                                                 
133 Although I will not explore the details, it is also relevant that mortgage and insurance products are subject 
to complex regulatory regimes that have not been designed with the goals of this sort of risk-offloading in mind. 
See Caplin et al., supra note 96, at 24-28.  A stand-alone product may quite properly be subject to state regulation, 
but regulators should address the product on its own terms rather than through regulations that were targeted at 
dissimilar products. 
134 Because H2.0 can reduce mortgage costs, the entity might also play a coordinating role in connecting 
consumers to lenders and negotiating discount packages.     
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implicates Ivor's interest in the property.  Typically, each sale would be a 
trigger for an H2.0 investor's payoff for precisely this reason.135 As a 
practical matter, then, it would be necessary to effectively reunite the 
property into a fee simple at each sales point, so that it can either be 
transferred in its entirety to a traditional homebuyer, or in its constituent 
parts to an H2.0 buyer and investor.  But if the H2.0 estate cannot survive 
resale, there is no reason to formulate it as an estate, rather than as a 
standardized set of contractual arrangements between the owner of a fee 
simple and an investor.  In addition, we might well resist adding another 
option to the limited slate of property forms for reasons that have been 
developed in the literature on numerus clausus.136  The fact that property 
rights, unlike contract rights, bind those who are not parties to particular 
agreements, argues for taking special care with the degree of customization 
that is permitted.137 
A less radical alternative would retain the fee simple estate as the basic 
unit of analysis, and accomplish the transfer of risk contractually within that 
structure. Although it is a question of terminology whether this route 
"really" produces a new tenure form, it can easily produce the functional 
equivalent of one by establishing a standardized contractual interface that 
accomplishes the basic move from traditional homeownership to the default 
H2.0 package.  Common interest communities provide a useful analogy.  
While members of these communities hold their individual parcels in fee 
simple and the community's common elements as tenants in common, their 
relationship with each other is altered in profound and fundamental ways 
from that which would usually obtain between neighbors by a set of 
reciprocal covenants routinely executed through the central figure of the 
developer upon each household's entry into the community.138 As that 
example illustrates, it is possible to piggyback significant substantive 
changes on existing possessory estates without giving up the ease of 
administration that accompanies use of standardized property forms. 
What I have in mind then, in casting H2.0 as a new tenure form is not a 
                                                 
135 Blanche could, in theory, buy an H2.0 estate subject to Ivor's claims against Henrietta (or Henrietta's 
claims against Ivor).  But if the interests can remain splintered as resales proceed, it is not clear when accounts 
will ever be settled.  If numerous resales were to occur between settlement points between investors and H2.0 
owners, the difficulties of disaggregating onsite and offsite impacts and determining who is to be paid what 
amount would presumably become increasingly intractable.    
 
136 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:  The 
Numerus Clauses Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000);  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, 
and Verification:  The Numerus Clauses Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002). 
137 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 136, at 26-35 (discussing how standardization of in rem rights reduces 
externalities from measurement costs); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 136, (arguing that the limited number 
of forms helps to provide adequate notice when property rights are divided).   
138 Because the covenants in common interest communities run with the land, the instruments employed are 
hybrids of property and contract.  In contrast, because H2.0 investments would settle up at each sales point, pure 
contract instruments would be sufficient.  
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new possessory estate, but rather a set of off-the-rack contractual 
arrangements that will quickly become familiar to homebuyers as a 
conceptually coherent alternative to traditional homeownership.  As I 
indicated at the outset, however, H2.0 will not lock homebuyers into one 
particular risk configuration.  The tenure form will come not only with 
default settings, but also with dials for adjusting away from those initial 
settings.  While the difference between this approach and simply supplying 
homeowners with a set of tools with which they can change their traditional 
homeownership bundle into something different may seem subtle, it is 
likely to be cognitively crucial.  Having a familiar and standardized set of 
arrangements for reallocating homeownership risk is also likely to be 
important to policymakers in evaluating and responding to the societal 
effects of changes in risk-bearing among homeowners.  
 
III.  COGNITIVE IMPLICATIONS 
 
One aspect of human psychology, loss aversion, suggests that H2.0's 
replacement of risky prospects with surer ones would be attractive.139  But 
there are also some obstacles to H2.0's adoption that are cognitive in 
nature.140  In addition, cognitive biases might lead people to misuse a new 
tenure form like H2.0.  In other words, we might worry both that people 
would not adopt H2.0 when it would be in their best interests to do so, and 
that people would use it for the wrong reasons or in the wrong ways.141  I 
will address these concerns in turn.   
 
A.    Barriers to Acceptance 
 
  Two features of human cognition, overoptimism and regret avoidance, 
might keep homeowners from using H2.0 when it would be in their best 
interest to do so.  Because framing is central to how the payoffs are viewed, 
the introduction of a new default point could help to address these concerns.  
                                                 
139 People dislike experiencing a loss much more than a failure to achieve an equivalent gain.  See, e.g., 
Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 193 (1991).  Of course, what constitutes a loss and a gain depends on the implicit baseline in use, which is 
a function of how the problem is framed. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions 
and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981); SHILLER, supra note 4, at 87. For a discussion of how loss 
aversion in the context of homeownership might interact with predatory lending, see Patricia McCoy, A 
Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725, 727-33 (2005). 
140 Shiller has written at some length on psychological obstacles to the adoption of financial innovations, 
including protection against home value volatility.  See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 3, at 17-30; SHILLER, supra 
note 4, at 82-98.   
141 My focus here is only on the perceptions of homeowners, and not of the investors who would be 
necessary to the successful operation of a program for reassigning homeownership risk.  Although investors as a 
group may have more sophisticated views of money and risk and may be relatively less burdened by cognitive 
biases, it is possible that resistance to novel financial arrangements would not come exclusively from the 
consumer side.   
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1. Overoptimism  
 
People tend to be more optimistic about many aspects of their lives and 
finances than is objectively justified.142 This overoptimism extends to 
investments generally and to home values specifically.143 If people believe 
their homes will not lose value, then purchasing downside risk protection 
will seem unnecessary. Likewise, if people hold unrealistic beliefs about 
their home's upward value trajectory, then the price at which an investor 
would be willing to buy the upside potential will seem too low. Thus, a 
valid initial question is whether overoptimism would make H2.0 a non-
starter.   
There are a few reasons why this might not be the case.  First, optimism 
and confidence among homeowners as to the predicted future value of their 
homes captures only part of the story.  Homeowners are by definition those 
who chose to buy notwithstanding the cost and risks involved.  Hence, a 
selection bias may be at work.  While people are generally optimistic, not 
everyone is equally optimistic on every topic.  Thus, in surveying the ranks 
of the homeowners, we would expect to see more of those who are 
optimistic about home values, and fewer of those who are less optimistic 
about home values.  Moreover, one of the potential advantages of the H2.0 
approach is as an affordability tool that facilitates home purchases.  
Optimism alone cannot turn those with too few resources into homebuyers.   
In addition, some homeowners may espouse optimism and confidence 
as a defense against cognitive dissonance and buyer's remorse.  Having 
made the purchase, it may be functional to assume that one has not made a 
horrible mistake.  This does not necessarily mean that one would not have 
chosen differently at the time of purchase if a lower-risk alternative had 
been available.  Some support for this thesis is found in the anecdotal 
                                                 
142 See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 806, 810 tbl.1 (1980); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 
Vand. L. Rev. 1653, 1659-61 (1998); SHELLY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND 
THE HEALTHY MIND 32 (1989).    
143 A recent poll that reflected "widespread unease about the U.S. economy," nonetheless found that only 16 
percent of respondents predicted a decline in the value of the household's home during the next six months, 
notwithstanding significant slowdowns in sales and mounting inventories.  David Streitfeld, Economic Fears 
Exclude Home Values, CHICAGO TRIB., April 12, 2007, Sec. 3, p. 1 (reporting on the results of a Los Angeles 
Times/Bloomberg poll).  In addition to optimistic projections about future price movements, homeowners may  
hold inaccurate perceptions of the home's current value.  See Sumit Agarwal, The Impact of Homeowners' 
Housing Wealth Misestimation on Consumption and Saving Decisions, 35 REAL ESTATE ECON. 135 (2007) 
(finding, in an empirical analysis of 81,943 home value estimates by homeowners and their financial institutions, 
that homeowners overestimate the home's value by 3.1% on average).   Homeowners may also experience 
"overconfidence" -- a distinct but related bias that involves an underestimation of the likelihood of error in one's 
assessment.  See, e.g., David Dunning, et al., The Overconfidence Effect in Social Prediction, 58 J. PERSON. & 
SOC. PSYCH. 568, 569 (1990) (reviewing literature on "miscalibrated judgmental confidence"); Daniel Kahneman 
& Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT SCI. 17, 
26 (1993) ("There is massive evidence for the conclusion that people are generally overconfident in their 
assignments of probability to their beliefs"). 
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evidence that homeowners tend to be very fretful participants in local 
government.  If they truly believed that they had no chance of suffering a 
decline in home values and that fabulous returns awaited them on resale, 
then the fear-driven behavior would be difficult to explain.   
Perhaps most importantly, H2.0 offers important outlets for optimism 
that may rival or exceed those offered by traditional homeownership.  
Significantly, H2.0 leaves the homeowner exposed to that subset of gains 
and losses that are squarely under her control -- that is, precisely where 
homeowners are most inclined to be optimistic.144  To the extent that 
indexes are used to determine payouts, for example, homeowners can 
channel their optimism into their own home's outperformance of the index.  
While there might be some concerns about disappointment on this front (not 
every home can outperform the index, just as not everyone can be above 
average), the optimism is likely to be functional in producing socially 
valuable behaviors. In addition, H2.0 facilitates moving money into other 
investment enterprises about which homeowners may be equally or more 
optimistic.   
 
2. Regret Avoidance  
 
Another reason that consumers might steer clear of H2.0 is regret 
avoidance.145 Attempts to avoid future regret, coupled with a cognitive 
apparatus that causes actions to be regretted more than omissions,146 can 
lead people to favor the status quo.147   
People are more likely to anticipate regret when they know that, after 
                                                 
144 This optimism translates into a greater willingness to take gambles that are viewed as under one's control.  
See SHILLER, supra note 3, at 24 ("Research on gambling behavior has stressed that most gamblers have 
preferences for activities that offer them some sense of control and mastery").  However, there is often an "illusion 
of control" regarding results that actually contain a large luck component.  See, e.g., Kahneman & Lovallo, supra 
note 143, at 27. 
145 See e.g., Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice 
Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805, 820 (1982) ("Regret theory rests on two fundamental assumptions: first, that 
many people experience the sensations we call regret and rejoicing; and second, that in making decisions under 
uncertainty, they try to anticipate and take account of those sensations:); David E. Bell, Regret in Decision 
Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RESEARCH 961 (1982). 
146 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 160, 
173 (1982) (presenting an example comparing the regret attributed to an actor (George) who sells stock in one 
company to purchase stock in another company and is worse off as a result, to that attributed to an actor (Paul) 
who is worse off by the same dollar amount because he stuck with the stock he owned and did not switch to a 
different company's stock).  Kahneman & Tversky suggest that the action (switching stocks) is easier to imagine 
having been otherwise: "Apparently it is easier for George to imagine not taking an action (and therefore retaining 
the more advantageous stock) than it would be for Paul to imagine taking the action."  Id. 
147 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the 
Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 340 (1986) 
(suggesting because "individuals weight the anticipated cost of regret more heavily than the corresponding benefit 
of pride" they may be inclined not to make a given choice, if they are otherwise in equipoise about it); see also  
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE:  PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 73 (1992) (noting 
an "asymmetry between omission and commission” in experiencing and anticipating regret over an unfavorable 
outcome); Daniel Kahneman, Varieties of Counterfactual Thinking, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN:  THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 375, 388–92 (Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson eds., 1995). 
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making their choice, they will obtain full knowledge not only about the 
outcome chosen, but also about the outcome that was not chosen.148  
Because many "paths not taken" involve significant uncertainty, people are 
often protected from regret (and hence from its anticipation) by an inability 
to fully assess what would have happened in the counterfactual state.149  In 
contrast, if one elects H2.0 over traditional homeownership, the 
counterfactual alternative remains continually in view of the homeowner as 
she follows housing trends in her neighborhood; it stands starkly at the 
center of her attention when the home is eventually sold. On average, 
houses will appreciate over time.  Hence, it might seem that regret would 
not be a rare occurrence for H2.0 owners, but rather the typical state of 
affairs.    
In assessing the significance of regret avoidance for the viability of 
H2.0, it is helpful to separate downside protection from the alienation of 
upside potential.  People frequently buy insurance without anticipating or 
experiencing any regret if no covered event occurs; on the contrary, 
insurance may be purchased precisely to avoid the regret that would come 
with failing to insure against a low-probability but severe event.150  Regret 
avoidance seems much more clearly implicated when people contemplate 
alienating the home's upside potential.  Self-serving attribution bias might 
be expected to amplify this effect.151 People tend to attribute good outcomes 
that they experience to skill, and bad outcomes that they experience to bad 
luck.152  Homeowners are thus likely to attribute any gains that are realized 
on a home to their own personal ability and savvy. If the early adopters of 
an H2.0 program felt cheated whenever they had to give up money they 
viewed themselves as having earned -- or if potential adopters could foresee 
                                                 
148 See, e.g., Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Outcome Knowledge, Regret, and Omission Bias, 65 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 119 (1995); Ilana Ritov, Probability of Regret: Anticipation of Uncertainty 
Resolution in Choice, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 228 (1996); Eric van Dijk & Marcel 
Zeelenberg, On the Psychology of 'If Only': Regret and the Comparison Between Factual and Counterfactual 
Outcomes, 97 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES, 152 (2005).   
149 See, e.g., van Dijk & Zeelenberg, supra note 148, at 156, 159.  Even when it is possible to objectively 
determine the value of an unchosen alternative, such as a stock one did not buy, people have limited attention to 
devote to tracking the progress of every alternative that was not selected over an extended period of time.   This 
observation is consistent with findings that unfavorable results from acts of commission tend to be "more 
available in memory," and hence their frequency may be overestimated.  See Dale T. Miller & Brian R. Taylor, 
Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and Superstition:  How to Avoid Kicking Yourself, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, 
supra note 147, at 305, 307-14. 
150 As Shiller has discussed, the name "insurance" itself may carry positive connotations that produce a 
particular framing effect.  See SHILLER, supra note 4, at 83-84. 
151 See, e.g., Amy H. Mezulis et al., Is There a Universal Positivity Bias in Attributions?:  A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Individual, Developmental, and Cultural Differences in the Self-Serving Attributional bias, 130 PSYCH. 
BULL. 711, [713-14] (2004) ("The self-serving attributional bias is defined as the tendency of individuals to make 
attributions for positive events that are more internal, stable, and global than their attributions for negative 
events."). 
152 See, e.g., NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE 
AND IN THE MARKETS 3 (2d ed. 2004) (contending that luck is often mistaken for skill, especially in "the world of 
markets") ; Eric Van den Steen, Skill or Luck? Biases of Rational Agents 1 (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working 
Paper No. 4255-02, June 2002), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=319972. 
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their own negative reactions on this score -- the program might not get off 
the ground, or might not stay off the ground for long.     
There are some additional factors that might mediate anticipated regret, 
however, at least for some homeowners.  The use to which the homeowner 
puts the benefits that she receives in exchange for the upside potential, as 
well as the other ways (if any) that the homeowner could obtain those same 
benefits, will be important.  First, consider a homeowner who uses H2.0 to 
get into a more expensive home than she could otherwise qualify to finance. 
The appropriate point of comparison on resale is not what the homeowner's 
house would have netted her had she not alienated equity rights, because 
that particular house would have been out of reach for the homeowner.  
Rather, the appropriate comparison would be the gains on resale from the 
less expensive house that she could have afforded without altering equity 
arrangements, less the disutility from having to live in that house rather than 
in the one she actually occupied for the duration of her ownership.  
Typically, there will be a much greater degree of uncertainty about the 
returns that the homeowner would have received had she opted for a house 
in a different price range than there will be about the returns on the house 
that she actually purchased.  Where an actor does not expect to have good 
information about the counterfactual outcome, anticipated regret is 
reduced.153 
Even if the returns on the cheaper alternative could be known with 
certainty (suppose the homeowner had previously identified a specific 
house in that less expensive price range, knew exactly the price at which 
she could have purchased it, and observed it being resold at precisely the 
same time as the house that she ended up buying), the counterfactual state 
of the world in which the owner bought the cheaper house is not directly 
comparable with the owner's actual outcome.  The consumption streams 
from the two homes involve incommensurable experiential elements that 
cannot be easily reduced to a common metric like money. Studies have 
shown that when the counterfactual and actual outcomes are not directly 
comparable, regret (and the anticipation of regret) is diminished.154  
Moreover, the consequences of the counterfactual state of living in a 
different house will often be both uncertain and difficult to compare (would 
                                                 
153 See supra note 148. 
154 See van Dijk & Zeelenberg, supra note 148, at 154 ("If comparability lies at the heart of regret, the (in) 
comparability of factual and counterfactual outcomes may be another feature explaining why we do not constantly 
go about kicking ourselves over forgone outcomes").  van Dijk & Zeelenberg studied this effect by asking subjects 
to imagine choosing between two "scratch cards" and finding, on the one they selected, either a $15 coupon for  
liquor or (in a different condition) a $15 coupon for books.  Id. at 155. They were then told that unchosen scratch 
card would have yielded them a $50 prize -- (in different conditions, either a $50 book coupon or a $50 liquor 
coupon).  When the forgone $50 card was for a different product category than the $15 prize given to the subject  
(e.g., where the subject received a $15 book certificate and the forgone prize was a $50 liquor certificate) reported 
regret was lower than when the actual prize and the forgone prize were from the same product category.  See id. & 
tbl. 2.   
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one's child have done as well in school?  would one have been the victim of 
a crime?).  Thus, regret avoidance may be muted or absent for people who 
anticipate using H2.0 to access better housing stock than they could 
otherwise qualify for.   
Not everyone will want to use H2.0 in this way.  People may use the 
benefits provided by H2.0 to pay down or avoid debt, or make other 
investments.  Assuming this category of buyers occupies the same homes 
that they would have occupied under traditional homeownership, the 
relevant comparison is the H2.0 payoff plus or minus the gains or losses on 
the other investments (or debt reduction).  Because all of these elements can 
be reduced to dollars, there is no lack of comparability.  When viewed ex 
ante, however, the house might be either a better or worse investment than 
the alternatives, making regret imaginable either way.  What may be most 
important, then, is which choice is viewed as the status quo arrangement 
and which is viewed as an active investment decision.   
A particular danger of actual and anticipated regret may exist when 
H2.0 is used as an alternative mechanism for raising funds that could 
instead be borrowed through a conventional loan.  The Bank of Scotland's 
experience with SAMs in the mid to late 1990s is instructive on this score.  
In exchange for giving up a share of their home's appreciation, customers 
were given interest-free loans that did not have to be repaid until the home 
was sold.  Because of the "shared appreciation" feature, however, the 
homeowners had to pay back not just the initial principal borrowed, but also 
a share of the home's appreciation from the time that the loan was taken out.  
Some customers became outraged when the amount that they owed to the 
bank grew as home prices experienced rapid appreciation, even though the 
loan documents had explained that this could happen.155  Rather than frame 
the transaction as one in which the right to some of the gains on resale were 
alienated in exchange for valuable benefits (interest-free access to money 
for as long as the homeowner wished to own the home), homeowners 
viewed the appreciation that had to be credited to the bank upon sale of the 
home as representing unconscionably high interest charges on the initial 
loan.156   
 
3. Framing and Defaults 
 
As the above discussion suggests, the way in which consumers frame 
transactions is very important.  Because people dislike losses much more 
than they resent failures to achieve gains, the implicit baseline from which 
                                                 
155 See, e.g., Jeff Prestidge, Trapped by 367% Interest Loan, thisismoney.co.uk, Jan. 8, 2006 (reporting that 
due to "[r]ampant house price inflation" an elderly couple with a SAM found that "the amount now due to the 
bank has swollen grotesquely").   
156 See id.  
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changes are measured matters a great deal.157  The baseline is also important 
to regret avoidance behaviors, because it determines which choices will be 
coded as commissions, and hence especially likely to trigger regret. 
Because traditional homeownership has long been the pervasive model in 
the U.S., it is inevitable that consumers will measure payoffs against that 
baseline, at least in part, for the foreseeable future.  However, H2.0's new 
default package could eventually represent a new baseline against which 
action or inaction could be assessed.    
Behavioral research shows that defaults can have quite a powerful 
influence on choices, drawing as they do on inertia, and perhaps also on the 
consumer's faith in those who have designed the institutional interface.158   
Because action would be required to move away from H2.0's defaults, the 
decision to take on offsite risk would be framed as a positive act.  In other 
words, the homebuyer must consciously choose to add in risk over factors 
lying outside of her parcel and over which she has no control.  If she adds in 
only the downside risk, she will save some money, but loss aversion is 
likely to steer her away from this move.  If she adds in the right to upside 
potential, her net outlay for the home increases.  She must ask herself 
whether she wants to invest in her local neighborhood housing market with 
that extra outlay, or whether she would rather invest in something else, like 
a stock index fund, or getting into a larger home, or paying down credit card 
debt.  
Framed in this manner, the choice to stick with the default arrangement 
may seem unexceptional.  It may also be less likely to induce regret, 
because one does not have to take any action to go with the default.  Of 
course, H2.0 will not be the only game in town; rather, it will be the new 
kid on the block.  Thus, it will not represent "the" default arrangement for 
homeownership, but rather only a competing paradigm for homeownership.  
The question is whether the new paradigm can be made attractive and 
familiar enough to gain the attention of consumers.    
Home sellers and realtors, who have an intense interest in moving 
homes into the hands of buyers, might be the natural parties to launch such 
                                                 
157 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263, 274, 278-79 (1979). 
158 See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., Passive Decisions and Potent Defaults, NBER Working Paper No. 9917 
(2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9917.  Some of the reasons that defaults make a difference in 
one of their most-studied contexts -- 401(k) plan choices -- would not be applicable to the present discussion.  As 
Choi and his coauthors explain, there is an option value to waiting to change from the default if the costs of doing 
so are expected to vary over time.  Id. at 3.  In addition, people may procrastinate on making an intended change, 
so that they stick with the default longer than they mean to.  Id.  Both of these considerations apply only when 
consumers have an open-ended time window in which to alter the default settings.  The H2.0 interface would 
presumably not have this feature, but rather would require making a decision of some kind at the time of home 
purchase.   One of the key features of defaults, that movement away from requires action, could be somewhat 
significant here, however, as could the consumer's view of the default as providing "implicit advice."  See id. at 3, 
18-19.  However, Choi et al.'s  suggestion that "[e]mployees may treat a zero default as weaker implicit advice 
than a non-zero default" might also translate over to H2.0.    
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a publicity campaign.159  H2.0's use of a single default setting would  
facilitate the easy communication of an "H2.0 price" along with the regular 
price. Multi-list software could be upgraded to permit homehunters to 
search within regular or H2.0 price ranges. If homes that previously seemed 
out of reach begin to show up on homeseekers' radar screens, we might 
expect significant consumer interest in this approach.   
 
B.  Potential for Misuse 
 
The discussion above suggested biases that might keep those who 
should use H2.0 from doing so, as well as some strategies for counteracting 
those biases.  But at least as worrisome is the possibility that cognitive 
biases might cause people to use H2.0 in ways that are ultimately self-
defeating.  The largest concern in this regard relates to time-inconsistent 
preferences.  It is well established that many people behave myopically at 
times, heavily discounting the future.160  Because the sale of upside 
potential under H2.0 would provide immediate consumption opportunities 
funded by a  delayed payment (in the form of foregone appreciation on 
resale), it might seem poised to exploit myopic individuals.  Currently, 
people aware of their own self-control problems may use their mortgages as 
a form of forced savings.161  If these payments are smaller and the wealth-
building potential they represent is reduced, then people might end up 
saving even less than they do now.   
There are several responses.  First, not all decisions to consume now 
and pay later are irrational.  The typical breadwinner's earning profile takes 
an inverted-U shape over the life cycle.  Under the permanent income 
hypothesis and the related life cycle hypothesis, people would be expected 
to consume in each period based on lifetime income, rather than on income 
received during that period alone.162  That is, they would be expected to 
spread their lifetime earnings optimally across the life cycle.  It is well 
documented that people do not, in fact, accomplish this idealized degree of 
consumption smoothing.163  Part of the problem relates to capital market 
imperfections, which make it very difficult to tap future wage earnings.  
                                                 
159 See Rex Agreement Co., http://www.rexagreement.com/index.php/rex/who_we_serve_realtors_why_rex/ 
(suggesting that realtors view the equity agreement as their "secret weapon"). 
160 See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 474, 479 (3d ed. 2000) 
161 See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyberbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443, 444-45 (1997) 
(discussing purchases of illiquid assets, such as homes, as precommitment strategies).  Laibson notes, however, 
that the ability to easily and quickly borrow against such assets undermines their capacity to serve as 
precommitment devices.  See id. at 465-66. 
162 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 26-31 (1957) (presenting the 
permanent income hypothesis); Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption 
Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 388 (Kenneth K. Kurihara 
ed., 1954) (presenting the life-cycle hypothesis).   
163 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation over Time, 59 TAX L. REV. 1, 16-21 (2005) 
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Making it possible to tap future earnings from an asset -- the home -- would 
be a more feasible way of introducing liquidity into the early part of the life 
cycle.164   
Even apart from these liquidity issues, it is difficult to establish that any 
particular tradeoff between current and future consumption should be 
objectively regarded as a mistake.165  What are easier to identify as mistakes 
are inconsistent time preferences, where an individual's earlier and later 
selves are in agreement that a given temporal tradeoff was suboptimal.166 
Where this is the case, it is helpful to have mechanisms in place that allow 
the earlier self to precommit to a more patient choice.  Having H2.0 
available only at the time of purchasing a home, with adequate periods for 
advice and reflection before choosing to enter into the agreement, should be 
helpful in this regard.167   
Perhaps most important to keep in mind, however, is the fact that 
innumerable opportunities already exist for myopic individuals to act in a 
manner that is counter to their own long-run interests.  Adjustable rate 
mortgages that can escalate out of the borrower's affordability window 
represent just one example -- one that, unlike H2.0, can cause families to 
lose their homes.  Similarly, home equity loans that allow the extraction of 
most of the value from homes during market peaks can set the stage for 
financial disaster if prices fall at a later time.168  It would be inaccurate to 
predict that a program like H2.0 would never get in the way of wealth-
building or cause any households to make choices that they will later view 
as ill-advised.  But given the many ways in which people can already thwart 
their own long-run interests, H2.0 seems like a relatively innocuous 
instrument. Indeed, mild forms of myopia might actually act to 
counterbalance other cognitive biases that would cause people to forgo the 
benefits of H2.0 (although it would be mere happenstance if they did so 
perfectly). 
We might also worry that a new form of homeownership would confuse 
consumers and make them more vulnerable to fraud and sharp practices. As 
many homeowners have fallen on hard times, "equity stripping" schemes in 
which the owner signs over the house deed in exchange for promises of 
                                                 
164 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 162, at 16 (“It is in general far easier to borrow on the basis of a tangible 
physical asset, or a claim to one, than on the basis of future earning power.”). 
165 The marginal utility of consumption might vary over time.  In addition, considerations like the interest 
rate, uncertainty about future events, and differing degrees of connectedness to other selves might rationally 
influence one's temporal preferences See, e.g., Baron, supra note 160, at 479-80 (noting these considerations and 
discussing Derek Parfit's work). 
166 See, e.g., id. at 475-78 (discussing dynamic inconsistency). 
167 See Shiller & Weiss, supra note 4, at 29 (suggesting limiting the purchase of hedging instruments to the 
time of home purchase, sale, or refinancing, noting that "[a]t these times, the homeowner has legal counsel and 
advice of others that would naturally be used to help make an informed decision about risk-management contracts 
as well").   
168 See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, A False Sense of Security?  You Must Own a Home, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007 
(reporting the increasing prevalence of homeowners removing equity from their homes via home equity loans).    
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freedom from mortgage payments have become increasingly prevalent.169  
Many homeowners have also accepted mortgages without understanding 
their most basic terms, such as the potential for mortgage payments to 
increase.  Whether these misunderstandings were due to misrepresentation 
or consumer inattention, they have placed a significant number of 
households in financial peril.  Would H2.0 make matters worse by 
introducing more complexity into the homebuyer's choice set? 
Some precautions would be necessary.  Perhaps most important among 
them is the characterization of H2.0 as a new tenure form, flagging that it is 
not just another product, but rather a different way of holding property.  
Required disclosures (including simulations showing various future states 
of the world), and standardized formats for key financial terms would assist 
both in consumer understanding and in comparison shopping.  Finally, H2.0 
must denote only those arrangements that comply with required disclosures 
and standards, so that consumers can readily distinguish it from other 
schemes. If these precautions were taken, H2.0 could actually reduce 
consumer vulnerability to sharp practices.  Homeowners' current 
susceptibility is driven by desperation and the lack of viable alternatives; by 
adding a legitimate alternative for increasing affordability, resort to sketchy 
alternatives would presumably be reduced.   
 
 
IV.  SOCIETAL IMPACTS 
 
Because nothing like H2.0 has ever been implemented on a broad scale, 
the larger societal effects of such a widespread change in the meaning of 
homeownership cannot be fully predicted.  In this Part, I will trace some of 
the potential benefits and concerns associated with such a change.   
 
A.  Changing Incentives for Collective Control 
 
H2.0, if it were implemented in a way that fully screened out the effects 
of offsite factors on the investment payoffs of homeownership, would 
dampen the incentives that presently drive homeowners' participation in 
collective control efforts at the local and sublocal levels.170 One rationale 
                                                 
169 Gretchen Morgenson & Vikas Bajaj, New Scheme Preys on Desperate Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 
2007.   
170 There is strong theoretical and anecdotal support for homeowners' larger role in local governance, but 
questions remain about the strength of the empirical connection between homeownership and social and political 
behaviors.  A recent view of the empirical literature concluded that "[a]s a whole, the existing literature suggests 
that homeownership has a modest impact on social and political behavior."    Dietz & Haurin, supra note 33, at 
430.  Apart from higher voting rates for homeowners, which have been consistently established, empirical results 
are sufficiently mixed that "no strong conclusions can be drawn at this time."  Id.   The discussion in this section 
assumes a significant level of homeowner influence arising from the fact of homeownership; the weaker the 
connection between tenure form and political and social behaviors, the less a shift to H2.0 ownership would 
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for withdrawing offsite investment risk factors from the homeowner's 
bundle is that these factors lie outside of the household's individual control.  
But, as Figure 2 emphasized, some factors are that lie outside of individual 
control are nonetheless amenable to the control of homeowners acting 
collectively.  An important question, then, is whether removing part of the 
homeowners' stake in collective control -- and transferring that stake to 
investors -- is socially valuable or socially costly on balance.  The question 
is a complex one that goes to the heart of local governance.   
Collective control is presently used by homeowners both for good 
(resolving local collective action problems or building bonds among 
neighbors in ways that are socially valuable on net) and for ill (excluding 
outsiders or offloading externalities onto them in ways that are socially 
costly on net).  Based on the net impacts, we can refer to these two 
categories of collective control as "value enhancing" and "value reducing," 
respectively. In the sections below, I will consider what H2.0's transfer of 
investment risk would do to each of these categories of conduct before 
turning briefly to the connections between property taxation, local 
governance, and the H2.0 form of ownership.     
       
 
1. Value-Enhancing Collective Control 
 
In The Homevoter Hypothesis, William Fischel  observes that a desire to 
maximize home values underlies local political behavior, and suggests that 
homeowners' politics generally tend to inure to the benefit of the 
community, and to society at large.171   For example, Fischel observes that a 
homeowner without children (or any prospect of children) will nonetheless 
be concerned about the quality of the local public schools, given the 
expected impact of school quality on her home's resale value.172  More 
generally, we would expect homeowners with a financial stake in a given 
community to do more to advance the fortunes of that community -- 
perhaps by participating in neighborhood watches, or otherwise helping to 
police and enforce behavioral and aesthetic norms.     
While these considerations are important ones, they do not support 
forcing homeowners to accept investment risks associated with local 
conditions.  Significantly, H2.0 would leave the homeowner exposed to 
risks to the quality of the consumption stream itself, whether emanating 
from onsite or offsite factors.  Safe, well-kept streets and fine amenities are 
                                                                                                                            
change matters.   
171 See generally FISCHEL, supra note 11.  However, Fischel has also argued that homeowners can be 
overzealous in defending their property values, and has suggested a form of home equity insurance as  a 
countermeasure.  See, e.g., id. at 268; Fischel, supra note 57. 
172 FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 5, 149-51.   
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not just good investments, they are desirable consumption ends in 
themselves.  Thus, we would expect H2.0 homeowners to continue to make 
localized investments in the community that will pay dividends in kind 
through the flow of housing services they consume. It is true that the exit 
option becomes less costly to the homeowner who becomes dissatisfied 
with her neighborhood, because she will not bear the full loss associated 
with a downward trend in prices.  But the protection against downside loss 
on resale also makes staying less risky, and hence less costly.    
It is also important to note that H2.0 would be expected to attract some 
households that would otherwise choose to rent, as well as some households 
that would otherwise opt for traditional homeownership.173  If tenants are 
deemed to be less engaged neighbors and community members than owners 
(on average),174  the move from tenancy to H2.0 would be an improvement.  
Even though H2.0 owners will not own all of the risk associated with their 
investment, they hold an option to stay in the community as long as they 
wish, and would therefore not be discouraged (as tenants presumably are) 
from making site-specific investments in the community.   
Finally, granting households the capacity to transfer unwanted 
investment risk elsewhere does not eliminate all stakeholding in 
communities; rather, it may produce a more effective class of 
stakeholders.175  In addition to those homeowners who continue to opt for 
the traditional model of ownership (with all upside and downside risk 
intact), outside investors would have an interest in ensuring that homes 
appreciate over time.  This combination of local stakeholding and investor 
monitoring could generate more balanced and rational local political inputs 
than those produced by individuals who are forced to bear unwanted, 
undiversified risks.176  Put another way, the losses to socially valuable local 
                                                 
173 It is difficult to predict the relative extent to which H2.0 would substitute for leaseholds and traditional 
freeholds, respectively, but we might reasonably expect some substitution from each direction.   
174 A variety of positive social effects have been associated with homeownership in the theoretical and 
empirical literature.  See, e.g., Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are 
Homeowners Better Citizens?  45 J. OF URB. ECON. 354 (1999); Donald R. Haurin et al., The Impact of 
Neighborhood Homeownership Rates: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature, 13 J. HOUSING 
REASEARCH 119 (2003).  Selection bias presents a difficulty in interpreting empirical results, however --  do 
people with good-neighbor characteristics just happen to become homeowners, or is there something about 
homeownership that improves their neighborliness? See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 35, at 1177; Haurin et al., 
supra, at 132-33.   Studies examining the effects of homeownership control for observable characteristics like age, 
marital status, and income, but it is still possible that unobservables influence both the tenure choice and the 
neighborly behavior.  See Gale, supra, at 1177.  Similar econometric challenges are implicated in attempts to 
determine the impacts of homeownership on a raft of other variables, including wealth, health, child outcomes, 
self-esteem, mobility, employment, and family composition.  See Dietz & Haurin, supra note 33.   
175 For example, Michael Pereira has argued that a company insuring all of a community's residences against 
home equity declines would be able to overcome collective action problems that the residents themselves might 
face.  Pereira, supra note 85, at 752-53 (giving an example in which the insurer could more effectively sue or 
bargain with a neighboring factory that was generating a nuisance).  Depending on the structure of markets for 
home equity investments, a single entity might not have such a large stake in a single community.  Nonetheless,  
the potential comparative advantages of different institutional actors in vindicating interests is worth noting. 
176 We might generally imagine that investors select into investments based on their risk tolerance -- the 
faint-hearted choose T-notes, while the daredevils choose junk bonds.  If such sorting were perfect, investors 
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participation associated with a diminished investment stakes in local 
conditions may be more than outweighed by the gains from reducing the 
political inputs of those who, as a result of fear, might be especially likely 
to push for value-reducing moves.   
 
2. Value-Reducing Collective Control 
 
Reducing home investment risk not only directly benefits the risk averse 
consumer, but also protects society from socially damaging actions that a 
consumer driven by unchosen risk might undertake.  This was precisely the 
impetus behind the earliest versions of home equity insurance, and it 
explains recent efforts to use such insurance to stem NIMBYism.  Free of 
the fear accompanying undiversified home value risk, the argument runs, 
homeowners will no longer pursue socially costly local collective actions.177 
While this is extraordinarily important potential benefit, it is important not 
to overstate it.   
First, the consumption interest that H2.0 homeowners would continue to 
have in their homes might still cause them to undertake socially costly 
collective actions.  However, that interest comes with an important built-in 
check -- that objections to particular changes must be couched in terms of 
the homeowner's own preferences and beliefs. Currently, homeowners can 
justify positions on local issues that would otherwise appear indefensible on 
the grounds of “preserving property values.”  For example, a homeowner 
who maintains that she does not personally mind having a homeless shelter 
or low-income housing project in her neighborhood may nonetheless 
oppose the shelter or project on the grounds that the person to whom she 
plans to resell her home several years hence will be less enlightened.178 A 
homeowner who is exposed only to consumption stream effects from such 
development, and not to the chance of resale value diminution, would have 
to forthrightly confront how much a given factor matters to her, rather than 
blame her actions on the supposed prejudices of others. 
Second, H2.0 lets homeowners shift risk onto investors who are in a 
position to diversify that risk away, but it does not eliminate the investors' 
incentives to avoid taking losses on the investment. While diversification 
works well to even out the effects of risk (variance), it cannot transform a 
low expected value event into a high expected value event. If a given 
change in a local area would unambiguously reduce property values, an 
                                                                                                                            
would not typically suffer bouts of white-knuckled terror over normal market movements; their investments 
would be suited to their comfort level.  However, because homeowners sort into homeownership for many reasons 
other than risk tolerance, we might expect many of them to be out of their comfort zone with regard to the home's 
investment risk.    
177 See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 57. 
178 See, e.g., Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 647-49 (2002) (book review of FISCHEL, supra note 
11) 
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investor presumably would be no happier with the prospect of that change 
than would a homeowner.  Thus, we might expect investors to demand 
some of the same sorts of covenants and zoning regulations that 
homeowners have long employed to guard against negative impacts on 
home values.  While investors may not be able to vote locally, they can 
express their demands through price signals to homeowners who wish to 
purchase protection against downside risk or sell upside potential.179    
Nonetheless, there are at least three ways that having investors hold risk 
rather than homeowners would be expected to curtail value-reducing 
behavior.  First, as Fischel has suggested, homeowners may oppose projects 
because of the high variance in outcomes, not because of low expected 
value.180  Shifting risk to diversified investors works well when the real 
problem is risk aversion (rather than a desire to avoid a sure loss).  Second, 
investors are at a physical and emotional remove from the local 
neighborhood  and have chosen consciously to take on a certain level of 
risk.  Hence, they would not be expected to be vulnerable to overblown 
fears or group hysteria about changes that are objectively unlikely to 
produce negative results. Third, and perhaps most importantly, investors are 
more likely than individual homeowners to hold offsetting interests in other 
properties or entities that would push them away from NIMBY behaviors.  
If the mark of NIMBYism is narrow self-interest that pushes externalities 
onto others, investors who hold positions in some of the offloaded-upon 
interests (other neighborhoods, localities, or entities) would be expected to 
eschew NIMBYism, at least where it is inefficient.181   
The resulting potential for positive effects on society can perhaps best 
be understood through the lens of the semicommons.  As Henry Smith has 
explained, medieval grazing and farming arrangements comprised a 
semicommons; the land was shared in common for purposes of grazing, but 
farming strips were individually owned.182 The farming strips held by a 
given owner were scattered throughout the grazing field.183  The scattered 
arrangement has been attributed to various purposes, such as diversification 
                                                 
179 These price signals could reintroduce the phenomenon of homeowners distancing themselves rhetorically 
from the positions that they take on local matters.  Instead of referring to a risk to property values, H2.0 
homeowners might refer to pricing risks in their dealings with investors.  If, however, payment obligations were 
fixed at the time the home is purchased (or even handled in lump sums at that time, as in the Syracuse pilot 
project, see supra note 96), current H2.0 homeowners would not be exposed to such pricing risks.  I thank 
Eduardo Peñalver for raising this point.   
180 See FISCHEL, supra note 11 at 9-11. 
181 Logically, there must be some instances where a "different backyard" is a better location from an 
efficiency perspective.       
182 See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
131 (2000). 
183 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1389 (1993) (providing an illustration of 
an open field village, adapted from maps dated 1719 appearing in GEORGE C. HOMANS, ENGLISH VILLAGERS OF 
THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 88-89 (1941)). 
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of risk, but Smith emphasizes its role in controlling strategic behavior.184 
Spatially interspersing the holdings of many different owners neutralizes 
each owner's temptation to use the commons in a way that would selectively 
offload costs onto the farmland of others or selectively direct benefits to his 
own land.185   
Neighborhoods, localities, and metropolitan areas can similarly be 
viewed as semicommons regimes.  Individual households own parcels of 
land, but many elements of value are held in common by a larger group.  
But these semicommons regimes largely lack the protection against 
strategic behavior that marked medieval grazing and farming arrangements.  
The politically powerless and impoverished are likely to be spatially 
concentrated, enabling wealthier and more powerful citizens to selectively 
burden those areas.  Concerns about such targeting have arisen in contexts 
involving the siting of locally undesirable land uses,186 the provision of 
public goods and services,187 and, of course, the exercise of eminent 
domain.188   
Slicing up interests in owner-occupied property and dispersing the slices 
among investors helps to sever the link between self-interest and geography.  
It is at least possible that the result will be a better-functioning political 
process in which a larger percentage of the population holds interdependent 
residential interests.  I do not want to overstate this point.  The interests of 
investors may diverge from those of homeowners in many ways.  More 
generally, making interests more diffuse may dilute investors' incentives to 
become involved in any particular dispute.  Yet, intertwining interests seem 
likely to ease the isolation and powerlessness of the most vulnerable 
communities.   
It is possible, however, that investment patterns would take a very 
different form. Unless some restrictions were placed on an investor's ability 
to hold geographically concentrated interests, a large investor might decide 
to "capture" a particular municipality by buying stakes in all of its housing 
stock and then taking over the political mechanism to serve its own (highly 
                                                 
184 Smith, supra note 182, at 146-54. 
185 See id.  
186 See, e.g., Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It?  Environmental Justice and the Siting of 
Locally Undesirable  Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993). 
187 An extensive literature has focused on disparities in the provision of public education.  For a recent 
example, see Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as Private Luxury, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 755 
(2004).  Disparities in the provision of other local services has also received some attention.  See, e.g., CHARLES 
H. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE 
COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY (1986); Clayton P. Gillette, 
Equality and Variety in the Delivery of Municipal Services, 100 HARV. L. REV. 946 (1987) (reviewing HAAR & 
FESSLER, supra).   
188 See, e.g., Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of 
Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2003) (examining the use of "blight" rhetoric to justify urban 
renewal efforts that targeted low-income minority neighborhoods); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. at 521-
22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contending that exercises of eminent domain for economic development purposes 
will disproportionately burden poor communities).   
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localized) interests.189  The rents that could be enjoyed through this kind of 
capture behavior could overwhelm the disadvantage to the investor of 
taking on such an undiversified investment package.  Concerns about such 
concentrated investments would be twofold.  First is a process concern, that 
H2.0 would make local governance less democratic and more dominated by 
special interests.  Second is the substantive concern that investor-dominated 
decisionmaking would be even more provincially self-serving, if large 
investors were able to more powerfully advance their interests than could 
homeowners acting collectively (a point open to empirical question).   
In order to achieve the advantages claimed on behalf of a system like 
H2.0, it might well be necessary to place some bounds on geographic 
concentration of investments or to package investment instruments in ways 
that automatically bundle together geographically disparate holdings that 
represent substantively similar types and levels of housing risk.  These 
design details cannot be worked out here, but stand as an important 
qualification to the enthusiasm that has accompanied the reallocation of 
housing risk.   
 
3. Property Taxes, Home Values, and Local Participation 
 
Property taxes are a key source of revenue for local governments, and 
are levied based on property values.190 This system of funding can be most 
easily squared with a world in which homeowners control taxing and 
spending decisions through their political activities and suffer from or enjoy 
the net results of changes in local amenities, home values, and taxes.  H2.0 
presents challenges to this model in terms of both liquidity and politics. If 
property values are increasing, but an H2.0 homeowner has alienated the 
right to some or all of those gains, what property tax treatment is 
appropriate?191   
Simply leaving the full property tax burden on the H2.0 homeowner is 
problematic. Rapid property tax increases can create severe liquidity 
problems, even apart from H2.0.192 But under traditional homeownership, 
rising property values create a pool of equity in the home that, at least in 
                                                 
189 I am indebted to Lior Strahilevitz for raising this point, and for very helpful discussions about it. 
190 See, e.g., RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 548-49 (6th ed. 2004) (noting that the property tax "provides about 30% of all local revenues, 
and nearly half of all locally provided or 'own-source' local revenues," making it "the key local government 
revenue source that is under local government control"); id. at 549  (explaining that "[t]he property tax obligation 
of a particular taxpayer is measured by the value of the property subject to tax").   
191 See Davis, supra note 50, at 85-87 (discussing this issue). 
192 Homestead exemptions and various forms of "circuit-breakers" offered by local governments can help to 
address the liquidity problem. See, e.g., LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 
470-71 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing homestead exemptions as well as "refunds, credits, or exemptions to low-
income, disabled, or elderly individuals, or to other groups of special need or desert"). 
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theory, can be tapped to pay the higher taxes.193  Under H2.0, rights to those 
gains would already have been sold, making tapping into them impossible.  
There is also a potential political difficulty.  The voting patterns of H2.0 
homeowners might be insufficiently protective of long-run property values, 
given that these homeowners will not bear the investment impacts.   
One approach, often advocated in the context of limited equity programs 
for low-income people, is simply to adjust the tax assessment downward to 
account for the owner's limited interest in the home.194 But this approach 
would quickly become unworkable and unfair as we move from a limited 
program available to a tiny percentage of the population to  a broad-based 
program that is available to everyone.  The property tax base would lag far 
behind gains in home values, requiring higher tax rates to meet budgetary 
demands, and these increases would be concentrated on traditional 
homeowners, distorting the choice between that form of homeownership 
and H2.0.   
Another possibility would be for the property tax to follow the equity 
interest, so that investors would be responsible for the percentage of the 
increase in property taxes that corresponds to their share of the appreciation 
potential. This solves the liquidity problem but introduces another political 
difficulty -- the investors cannot vote in the local elections and therefore 
would be liable for tax burdens that they had no hand in creating. H2.0 
homeowners might then vote for tax increases to fund amenities that they 
wish to consume, knowing that the bill for these increases would fall on 
others. It is possible, of course, that investors would come to have influence 
through non-voting mechanisms, just as any other special interest group 
might, but getting the political incentives properly aligned will be difficult.   
Another alternative would be for the investor to front the money to pay 
for all property tax increases attributable to increased assessments, thus 
solving the liquidity problem.  These advances could be treated as loans to 
be forgiven in whole or in part based on the ratio between the tax increases 
and the gains that the investor ultimately realizes on the property.  Although 
his solution is not perfect and would require considerable fine-tuning, it 
would aim at the right target -- creating an incentive for the homeowner to 
act in the investor's long-run interests, while making the investor bear the 
costs associated with achieving those interests.  In the longer run, if H2.0 
became the dominant form of homeownership, the method of financing 
might be altered to better align with it.   
 
                                                 
193 For example, home equity loans might be used to generate liquidity to pay the taxes.  
194 See Prowitz v. Ridgefield Park Village, 568 A.2d 114, 118-19 (N.J. App. Ct. 1989) (upholding a reduced 
tax assessment for a home that was subject to a resale cap as part of an affordable housing program, finding the 
resale restriction "analogous to value-depreciating government regulation");  Davis, supra note 50, at 86-87 
(citing and discussing Prowitz).   
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B.  Stability and Stickiness in Housing Markets 
 
H2.0 would also have important effects on incentives to buy and sell in 
changing markets. Under traditional homeownership, downward-trending 
housing markets can suffer from inertia: Current owners refuse to accept 
prices that are any lower than the property could command at its most 
recent peak, while would-be buyers refuse to pay anywhere near that 
amount.195  Sales volume plummets, inventory piles up, but prices do not 
respond accordingly, at least in the short run.196  The result is diminished 
mobility among homeowners.197  This stickiness may be driven in part by 
liquidity constraints (the need to pay off an existing mortgage or the desire 
to walk away with sufficient equity to make a downpayment on a new 
home), but loss aversion seems strongly implicated as well.198  
H2.0 might be expected to help in three ways.  First, sellers who are  
protected against downward price trends might be less reluctant to sell.  
Second, buyers who can purchase protection against future price drops 
might be less reluctant to buy.  Third, to the extent that equity financing 
(selling off upside potential) begins to take the place of debt financing, the 
liquidity problems that produce lock-in effects may become rarer.  In 
combination, these three advantages would be expected to dampen the 
feedback effects of declining market conditions on mobility choices.  
Widespread risk buffering through H2.0 therefore benefits housing 
consumers in general, not just those who have opted for H2.0.199  Because 
of its potentially favorable societal and macroeconomic effects, the risk 
buffering aspects of H2.0 have some of the characteristics of a public 
                                                 
195 See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 3, at 171. 
196 We seem to be presently in the midst of just such a phenomenon.  See, e.g.,  Sundeep Reddy and Michael 
Corkery, Housing Chill Grows Worse, Bites Consumers, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 2007 (reporting based on newly-
released data that "home inventories by one measure soared to an 18-year high").   
197 Tammy Joyner, Relocation Reluctance Hitting Job Market, Chicago Trib., July 1, 2007, Sec. 14, p. 41.  
Some research has even explored a possible link between homeownership rates and longer bouts of 
unemployment, perhaps stemming from homeowners' limited mobility.  See Steven F. Landsburg, Everyday 
Economics:  Buy a House, Lose Your Job?, SLATE, Nov. 7, 1997 (discussing data indicating a correlation between 
homeownership rates and unemployment rates and the hypothesis for the relationship put forward by Andrew 
Oswald, as well as some alternative explanations for the data); Dietz & Haurin, supra note 33, at 419-21 
(reviewing literature on this point).   
198 For example, an empirical study of condominium sales in Boston between 1990 and 1997 showed that 
sellers facing a loss from the benchmark of the nominal price paid for the home chose higher asking prices and 
took longer to sell their homes than other sellers -- a result consistent with loss aversion.  See David Genesove & 
Christopher Mayer, Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1233 
(2001).  Turning down offers below the purchase-price benchmark may be understood as risk-seeking behavior 
consistent with the "trying to break even" phenomenon.  See Richard H. Thaler & Eric J. Johnson, Gambling with 
the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 36 MGMT. SCI. 643, 
657-58 (1990).  It is not clear that holding out for a better price is always irrational, however.  See Stephen Day 
Cauley & Andrey D. Pavlov, Rational Delays, 24 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON.  143 (2002) (suggesting that 
holding out during down markets can be rational, if the option value of doing so exceeds the carrying costs of the 
home).   
199 Caplin, supra note 96, at 28 (discussing the potential social benefits of Syracuse's home equity insurance 
pilot program for those not enrolled in it).   
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good.200    
A concern might arise if we thought that such a program would increase 
mobility overall and thereby produce neighborhood instability.  Indeed, it is 
sometimes suggested that homeowners' irrational reluctance to avoid taking 
losses on their homes encourages them to stay put and agitate for changes 
that will drive their home values back up.  But downward price protection 
might give homeowners newfound confidence to stay in their 
neighborhoods when price downturns threaten.201  Another way that H2.0 
might deliver greater stability is simply by encouraging more 
homeownership.202 Studies consistently show that homeowners are less 
mobile than renters.203 Such studies may be picking up on some of the 
stickiness that H2.0 would alleviate, but it is likely that much of the effect is 
attributable to transaction costs associated with buying and selling a 
home.204   While it cannot be said with certainty which of several mobility 
related effects will dominate, there is at least the potential for less stickiness 
in housing markets without any loss in stability.   
 
C.  Competitive Consumption  
 
Another concern with widespread implementation of H2.0 is that it will 
alter the very housing markets that it was designed to assist consumers in 
navigating. H2.0 would have the immediate effect of multiplying the 
average homeowner's purchasing power.  If too many dollars were chasing 
the same houses, there would be housing price increases, at least in the short 
run.205 Over time, however, we would expect housing supply to expand in 
response to these changes.206 Following these adjustments, would we expect 
to see consumers allocating a smaller share of their income and wealth to 
housing and diverting their extra purchasing power to other, more 
diversified uses, or would we instead see an increase in the total amount of 
housing consumed?     
Robert Frank has suggested that people engage in competitive 
consumption in their efforts to attain relative standing.207  Homes are one of 
the primary vehicles through which such competition is carried out.  It is 
                                                 
200 See id.; SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS, supra note 3, at 207-08 (discussing financial innovations as public 
goods). 
201 See Caplin et al., supra note 96, at 28 (suggesting that home equity protection programs might have 
"confidence-building effects" even if not many households purchase the protection). 
202 See Caplin et al., supra note 13, at 17-22 (presenting rough calculations that suggest shared equity 
mortgages could increase homeownership by more than one percent).   
203 See Dietz & Haurin, supra note 33, at 416-18.   
204 See id. 
205 See CAPLIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 219-20  (predicting that housing partnerships would create short-run 
price increases, which could be "quite significant"). 
206 See id. at 219. 
207 See ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 159-60 (1999) 
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not just a matter of outdoing the Joneses with respect to square footage or 
fancy trim. Rather, people bid against each other for homes in particular 
neighborhoods and school districts because those neighborhoods and school 
districts are better, in relative terms, than other neighborhoods and school 
districts.208  With so much riding on the choice of a home, people often 
stretch themselves quite thin to get a foothold in a premier neighborhood, 
even when it means placing themselves at risk of foreclosure and 
bankruptcy.  It is worth thinking about how H2.0 might affect incentives in 
this regard. 
By using H2.0, many people could get into more expensive homes than 
they could otherwise afford.209  The initial effect would be to allow more 
people of modest means into neighborhoods that are a rung or two higher on 
the ladder than the neighborhoods they would have been able to occupy 
previously.  But if everyone responded by employing H2.0 to purchase a 
bigger and better house, the existing  pattern of relative housing quality 
would presumably be replicated -- but with everyone living in more 
expensive homes than before.210 In other words, if people follow the 
heuristic of buying as much house as they can afford, a mechanism that 
shifts the affordability benchmark upward would simply result in increased 
consumption of housing.   
Even if the houses people buy are objectively larger or nicer, adaptation 
effects and a focus on relative standing might leave people no happier -- and 
no more diversified -- than before. The risk associated with the lack of 
diversification would be lower, however, because variance in outcomes due 
to factors out of the household's control will have been reduced or 
eliminated.  We might also say that "debt reduction" has been achieved, if 
we compare the situation to a baseline in which people were financing these 
same homes with debt alone.  But because they could not have afforded to 
do so, that would be a false comparison.   
One factor that could prove helpful in this regard is inertia.  If most 
people continue to live in their current homes, at least in the short run, any 
upward shift in housing consumption would be gradual and perhaps 
concentrated toward the lower end of the housing stock continuum. 
Socioeconomic mixing that occurred during the early (inertial) stage of 
                                                 
208 See id. at 159. 
209 Andrew Caplin and his coauthors suggest that the increased affordability associated with equity financing 
would not have uniform effects throughout the income distribution, because "at some point the borrower achieves 
an income level that makes it possible to pay regular mortgage interest on the most valuable house that their assets 
will permit them to purchase."  Caplin, supra note 13, 15 & tbl. 6. 
210 A backlash against larger homes seems to be brewing, however, perhaps reflecting shifting norms about 
housing consumption.  See, e.g., Nicholas Riccardi, Leveling Restrictions on McMansions, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 
2007 (discussing proposed or implemented restrictions on oversized homes in several metropolitan areas); 
Kenneth R. Harney, Tax Deduction Under Fire for "McMansions," WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2007, at F01 (reporting 
on a "carbon tax" bill that would withdraw the federal income tax deduction for mortgage interest on homes that 
are over 3,000 square feet in size).   
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H2.0 could perform an educative function, reducing the perceived need to 
get into a more exclusive setting. If diminished concerns about resale values 
softened some of the exclusionary policies of local governments, this could 
also be helpful in reducing stratification and lowering the pressure to get 
into a particular neighborhood or school district.  Ultimately, however, 
larger reforms aimed at altering the incentives toward socioeconomic 
stratification might be necessary to prevent competition in housing 
consumption from erasing many of the advantages of H2.0.   
 
D.  Autonomy and Conformity 
 
Another concern is that investor pricing practices could interact with a 
competitive consumption dynamic to pressure H2.0 households to 
relinquish many of the prerogatives that have traditionally accompanied 
homeownership.  I have observed already that notwithstanding their risk 
tolerance, investors want to avoid losses.  They may therefore send price 
signals to homeowners about the kinds of land use restrictions that must be 
in place in order to receive top dollar for upside potential or the best deal on 
downside protection.  In concept, this is no different than an insurer offering 
a discount for features like fire extinguishers and deadbolts, but the kinds of 
restrictions that would maximize investment returns might not necessarily 
optimize the homeowner's consumption experience.211   If getting one's 
child into the best school means buying in the most exclusive 
neighborhood, and if buying in the most exclusive neighborhood means 
granting investors nearly all of one's discretion over the minutiae of 
everyday life, then we might begin to see an overall reduction in the 
autonomy that homeowners enjoy.  
The fact that any such effect would stem from individual households 
choosing to make bargains does not provide a full answer.  If the ceding of 
autonomy represents a competitive strategy in trying to get into the best 
possible home, and if everyone undertakes that strategy, then everyone 
loses autonomy and gains nothing in relative position.  Hence, autonomy 
must be conceded just to keep one's previous place in the neighborhood 
(and public school) hierarchy.  Moreover, there may be society-wide 
externalities associated with many or most households giving up the 
personal autonomy that goes with homeownership.212  The sense of 
                                                 
211 Of course, we would expect the two to be related.  The resale price should reflect what homeowners find 
valuable about the home, and if restrictions on autonomy are aversive, then the price homeowners are willing to 
pay should drop accordingly.  This might not happen, however, if homeowners misgauge how much the lost 
autonomy would mean to them or if competitive pressures to attain the highest possible relative standing in the 
housing market overwhelm considerations relating to the day-to-day consumption experience.   
212 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 U. DENV. L. 
REV. 859, 870-72 (1995) (observing that where constitutional rights produce positive externalities, the interests of 
more than just the rights-holder are implicated in bargains to cede them). 
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individual responsibility and self-direction that may currently go with 
homeownership could begin to atrophy, and society as a whole might 
become more conformist than anyone would prefer.   
One response to these worries, albeit not an entirely satisfying one, is 
that these concerns are already implicated by the widespread use of 
restrictive covenants in common interest communities. What may be 
needed, then, is not a ban on innovation in homeownership, but a more 
global form of pushback against undue intrusions on personal liberty in 
housing.  Nonetheless, the possibility that H2.0 could intensify what many 
already see as a very troubling trend toward reduced residential autonomy 
must be taken seriously.   
 
 
V.  AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This paper's introduction of H2.0 only scratches the surface in exploring 
the potential for, and implications of, a widespread shift in the meaning of 
homeownership.  This part will briefly flag some additional areas of 
research that might prove instrumental in designing and implementing a 
new paradigm for owner-occupied housing. 
 
A.  Tailored Risk Bearing:  H3.0 and Beyond 
 
In this paper, I have conceptualized H2.0 as a new package that would 
shift the default arrangement from one in which offsite risk is customarily 
bundled with homeownership to one in which it is not.  Homebuyers would 
then be free to dial back in the desired level of investment in offsite factors.  
My brief discussion of this interface has suggested that the dials would be 
purely quantitative in nature, allowing a homebuyer to take on, say, ten 
percent of offsite risk.  But it would also be possible to construct dials or 
levers organized along qualitative lines, or keyed to other economic 
indicators.  Two examples will help to illustrate how future versions of 
homeownership might evolve beyond H2.0's simple notion of adding in 
risk.   
Many homebuyers correctly anticipate that the sale of their current 
home will be followed by the purchase of another home.  Accordingly, they 
may not fear home value shifts that would affect the prices of their current 
and future homes in equal measure; their purchasing power will not be 
eroded by a drop in their current home's price that is matched by a drop in 
prices in their new market.  Instead, they fear shifts in their current housing 
market that are uncorrelated with changes in other housing markets in 
which they expect to buy.  Thus, we could imagine variations on the H2.0 
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concept that would provide homebuyers with protection against the special 
risks that come from transitioning to one housing market to another -- that 
one's local housing market will have suffered declines that are uncorrelated 
with declines in other areas, or that the gains in one's local housing market 
will have failed to keep pace with those in other areas.   
Specialized products might therefore be developed that keyed payoffs 
not merely to changes in the homeowner's local housing market, but to 
relationships between those changes and changes occurring on other local 
housing markets. If we think that homebuyers can do a good job of 
predicting the markets in which they plan to buy and the time at which they 
hope to buy, they could, in theory, make the appropriate investments on 
their own.  But a more viable product for widespread adoption would take 
into account shortfalls in predictions.  Such a product might, for example, 
offer homebuyers a payoff stream that would effectively stabilize the 
inflation-adjusted purchasing power represented by their current home, 
regardless of which housing market within the country the homeowner later 
moved to, and regardless of whether she ended up choosing not to purchase 
another home at all.   
A second example of tailored risk-bearing would involve drawing 
qualitative distinctions between different sources of housing market risks.  
Recall, for example, Figure 2's distinction between offsite risks that are 
completely out of homeowner control and those that are within the control 
of homeowners acting collectively.  I have suggested some reasons that the 
offsite risk factors amenable to collective control need not be a mandatory 
component of  homeownership.  However, some homeowners might wish to 
bear risks associated with these highly localized changes occurring at the 
local or neighborhood level without taking on regional or national housing 
market risks -- or vice versa.  Likewise, investors might wish to slice up the 
risks of home value changes along qualitative lines for resale in secondary 
risk markets.  Even finer distinctions between sources of home value risk 
might be developed, and traded independently of each other.   
 
B.  Government's Role 
 
Throughout the paper, I have assumed that H2.0 would be the product 
of private actors working through markets.  But it would also be possible 
for a governmental agency to be directly involved in launching and 
fostering H2.0.  Indeed, early discussions of home equity insurance posited 
a central role for a governmental agency.213  Governmental involvement 
                                                 
213 See Marcus & Taussig, supra note 3 (proposing the establishment of a government program, the Home 
Owners' Insurance Corporation, to insure single-family owner-occupied homes under a particular value against 
equity loss due to locational factors). 
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might be used to overcome inertia, resolve collective action problems, 
ensure that H2.0 develops along particular lines, or blend redistributive 
policies with the risk transfers undertaken under H2.0.  On the last point, it 
is notable that upside and downside risks will vary across the country, and if 
actuarially priced, could yield significant differences in the cost of 
downside protection or the amount of equity financing available to purchase 
a home.  A governmental agency could build in a subsidization program 
that would even out these differences.   
 Even if no governmental agency is directly involved in developing and 
implementing H2.0, some form of regulatory action would undoubtedly be 
required, given that H2.0 would be a novel and complex financial product 
marketed to the general public.  We would expect a body of law to develop 
around this new tenure form to regulate the way in which it is offered to 
consumers and investors.   I have already noted some concerns that such 
regulation might address, including the concentration of investment stakes 
within particular communities, as well as concerns about making H2.0 
implications comprehensible to homebuyers.  Certain kinds of pernicious 
investor activities, such as "redlining" particular neighborhoods, might be 
reached either through existing antidiscrimination laws or through new 
legislation tailored for H2.0.  Regulation might also be used to narrow 
choice sets to prevent homebuyers from making certain kinds of predictable 
and costly mistakes, or to address some of the collateral concerns about 
competitive consumption that might be sharpened if H2.0 were to become 
widespread.    
  Tax policy decisions would also be necessary.  The federal tax code 
incorporates a heavy subsidy for traditional homeownership.214  Whether 
the subsidies granted to H2.0 homeowners should be equally heavy depends 
on the extent to which H2.0 ownership serves the social purposes that 
underlie the current tax expenditures.  H2.0 delivers the secure option to 
stay put that is arguably the most important feature of homeownership.  
While the lack of an investment stake in the fortunes of the neighborhood 
might seem to cut against extending full tax benefits to the H2.0 
homeowner, H2.0 homeowners are exposed to the consumption risks that 
attend neighborhood changes. Because they will not be involuntarily forced 
out of the neighborhood, they are free to make the kinds of site-specific 
investments in the community that can help to generate social capital and 
other positive externalities associated with homeownership.  
If we assume for the sake of argument that H2.0 ownership is as worthy 
of subsidization as is traditional homeownership, then the tax code should 
treat these two kinds of ownership equally.  This may be easier said than 
done, however.  If H2.0 substitutes in part for mortgage financing and alters 
                                                 
214 See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.   
62 Fennell [11-Oct-07 
the amount of property taxes paid, H2.0 homeowners would receive less 
advantage from the tax code's mortgage interest and property tax deductions 
than their traditional homeowners counterparts.  Equalizing the treatment of 
capital gains would be even more challenging, given that H2.0 would assign 
some or all of those gains to investors, who would not currently qualify for 
the tax code's capital gains exemption for owner-occupied housing.215  More 
comprehensive reforms to the tax treatment of homeownership might be 
preferable, of course, and the introduction of H2.0 could offer a propitious 
moment to undertake them.    
 
C.  Beyond Housing 
 
H2.0 would form only one part of a growing trend toward increasingly 
sophisticated risk management. While this paper has focused exclusively on 
homeownership, an area of undiversified risk that seems especially 
amenable to improvements through the appropriate use of financial 
instruments, the idea of reconfiguring risk has been extended to other areas.  
For example, Robert Shiller's work has addressed the possibility of 
insurance markets for occupations based on an indexing system similar to 
that used to measure changes in housing markets.216  Predictions markets 
occupy a closely related field of research, in which trading on uncertain 
events generates information about those events that can yield more 
accurate pricing of risks.217 For example, weather derivatives, such as those 
that pay off based on rainfall, can help to manage the risks of those engaged 
weather-sensitive enterprises.218   
H2.0 therefore offers not only a model for how homeownership might 
be reconceived, but also paradigm case for thinking carefully about the 
gains that might be achieved through the buying and selling of all manner of 
routine risks.  Derivatives have gained tremendous ground over just the last 
few decades, and currently occupy a role in the economy that would have 
been unimaginable half a century ago.219  We may well be standing on the 
                                                 
215 It is perhaps significant that the tax code offers the same capital gains advantages granted to homeowners 
to "tenant-stockholders" living in housing cooperatives.  See 26 U.S.C. § 121(d)(4).  While the situation of these 
tenant-stockholders is not analogous to that of outside investors (they live in the home and hold shares in the 
cooperative corresponding to the value of their residence), the inclusion of this provision shows a willingness to 
look beyond the formal correspondence of ownership and occupancy in granting tax advantages.  See also 26 
U.S.C. § 163(c) (treating ground rent as mortgage indebtedness for purposes of the tax code).   
216 See SHILLER, supra note 4, at 110-13. 
217 For a recent overview of predictions markets, see Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 109, at 1349-60. 
Twenty-five scholars recently drafted a statement urging that regulatory barriers to the development of such 
predictions markets be lowered.  See Kenneth J. Arrow, et al., Statement on Prediction Markets, AEI-Brookings 
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 07-11 (May 2007) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=984584.   
218 See, e.g., Come Rain or Come Shine, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2007; CME Weather Products, 
http://www.cme.com/trading/prd/weather/; see also Michael Lewis, In Nature's Casino, N.Y. TIMES (magazine), 
Aug. 26, 2007 (discussing "catastrophe bonds" used to hedge against natural disasters). 
219 For background on the history and regulation of derivatives, see, e.g., Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail 
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verge of even more momentous changes that will bring the financial tools of 
risk management to ordinary people in transformative ways.  Such changes 
are not without costs and downsides, however.  This paper has attempted to 
temper its enthusiasm for the potential of new forms of risk management 
with an exploration of some of the concerns that must be addressed if such 
innovations are to produce the hoped-for social gains.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Homeownership has moved out of alignment with economic and social 
reality.  A new version of homeownership designed to bring the household's 
exposure into line with its effective scope of control offers tremendous 
potential.  By allowing owners to alienate both upside and downside home 
equity risk,  homeownership can be made more stable and less expensive, 
homeowners more secure and less fearful, and local governmental decisions 
less narrow and exclusive. Of course, H2.0 is no magic bullet; it cannot 
solve underlying problems of economic inequality and socioeconomic 
stratification.220  In addition, the cognitive and societal implications of  
changing the investment structure of homeownership require careful 
consideration.  But homeownership is in crisis, and it is time to think 
creatively about what the institution does and does not require, and to put 
into place the necessary mechanisms to make changes in how it is 
conceptualized.  My treatment here has been far from comprehensive, but I 
hope that it will spur further conversation and debate on this topic.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
220 See Caplin et al., supra note 13, at 5 (observing that shared equity mortgages "are not a panacea for 
problems of housing affordability and the associated wealth-building constraints"). 
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